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The aggregate effects of labormarket frictions
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Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
David Ratner
Division of Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board
Labor market frictions are able to induce sluggish aggregate employment dynam-
ics. However, these frictions have strong implications for the source of this prop-
agation: they distort the path of aggregate employment by impeding the flow of
labor across firms. For a canonical class of frictions, we show how observable
measures of such flows can be used to assess the effect of frictions on aggregate
employment dynamics. Application of this approach to establishment microdata
for the United States reveals that the empirical flow of labor across firms deviates
markedly from the predictions of canonical labor market frictions. Despite their
ability to induce persistence in aggregate employment, firm-size flows in these
models are predicted to respond aggressively to aggregate shocks, but react slug-
gishly in the data. The paper therefore concludes that the propagation mecha-
nism embodied in standard models of labor market frictions fails to account for
the sources of observed employment dynamics.
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What are the effects of labor market frictions on aggregate employment dynamics? In
this paper, we provide a new approach to this question for a canonical class of frictions.
This class encompasses influential models of fixed adjustment costs that induce inter-
mittent, discrete adjustments (Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997)); per-worker
hiring, and firing costs that induce further distortions to the magnitude of adjustments
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(Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993); and search and match-
ing frictions (Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)).
These models of labor market frictions are a compelling class to study, from both mi-
cro and macroeconomic perspectives. First, they are able to capture a key stylized fact of
microeconomic establishment dynamics, namely the empirical prevalence of inaction
in employment adjustment. Second, we show that some models in this class, especially
those including search frictions and other per-worker costs of hiring and firing, are also
able to propagate aggregate shocks and induce sluggishness in aggregate employment
dynamics, thereby contributing to a key stylized fact of macroeconomic adjustment.
Thus, models in this class provide potentially fertile ground for an explanation of the
microfoundations of aggregate employment dynamics. And, any successful explanation
in this class will imply a prominent aggregate role for labor market frictions. Perhaps for
these reasons, such models inform a large body of modern research on aggregate labor
markets.1
Our contribution in this paper is to inspect the channel through which canonical la-
bor market frictions distort the path of aggregate employment, and to confront it with
novel empirical evidence. We show that the fundamental channel through which mod-
els of frictions in this class are able to propagate aggregate employment dynamics is by
restricting the incidence and/or size of employment adjustments, and thereby retarding
the flow of labor across the firm-size distribution. Aggregate employment dynamics and
firm-size flows are thus inextricably linked in these models. And, crucially, these firm-
size flows can be measured in establishment panel data, opening up the possibility of
a new empirical evaluation of the propagation mechanism embodied in a large class of
canonical models.
Our findings suggest that standard labor market frictions provide a poor account of
the dynamics of firm-size flows. Under these models, we show that the flows are pre-
dicted to respond aggressively to aggregate shocks. Intuitively, since the frictions re-
tard the flow of labor, there is a “pent-up” demand for adjusting, which implies that the
flows (though dampened in levels) are very elastic to shifts in the aggregate state. In the
data, however, firm-size flows evolve sluggishly following macroeconomic disturbances.
Since the behavior of these flows lies at the heart of the propagation mechanism inher-
ent in all models in this canonical class, this failure suggests that standard frictions also
provide a poor account of the empirical sources of aggregate employment persistence.
While they may account for microeconomic inaction, and aggregate persistence, they
do so at the cost of predicting counterfactual microdata on the firm-size flows through
which these observations are predicted to be linked.
It is important to distinguish this contribution from prior related work. Several pa-
pers have explored the extent to which some of the models we consider are able to in-
1An exhaustive list of models in this class is too numerous to cite. Additional examples include Hamer-
mesh (1989), Caballero and Engel (1993), and Bachmann (2012) for fixed costs; Oi (1962) and Nickell (1978)
for linear frictions; and Elsby and Michaels (2013) and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) for “large-firm” exten-
sions of search frictions. Further prominent studies that consider hybrids of these frictions include Bertola
and Caballero (1990), Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Bloom (2009), Pissarides (2009), and Cooper, Halti-
wanger, and Willis (2007, 2015).
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duce sluggish aggregate employment. Our contribution contrasts with, and builds on
this literature in two ways.
First, the majority of this literature explores the aggregate implications of fixed ad-
justment costs only (e.g., Caballero and Engel (2007), Elsby and Michaels (2019), Khan
and Thomas (2008)). By contrast, our analysis further admits analysis of linear and
search costs. This is important since, as we will show, the latter generates much greater,
and more realistic propagation of aggregate employment dynamics relative to models of
fixed costs.
Second, we further show that the propagation mechanism in this class of models
can be evaluated empirically by inspecting the behavior of firm-size flows. This too is
important, as prior literature has broadly neglected these flows. Yet, we show that these
frictions impinge on aggregate employment outcomes only by distorting these flows.
That the dynamics of the model-implied flows deviate substantially from their empiri-
cal counterparts therefore calls into question the credibility of the models’ propagation
mechanism.2 In other words, even if some of these models are able to produce realistic
sluggishness in aggregate employment, the means by which they do so can be, and is
refuted by the data.3
We begin in Section 1 by establishing the theoretical results that will inform our later
empirical analysis. Here, we show that intermittent adjustment implies that only a frac-
tion of desired, frictionless adjustments are implemented, retarding flows of labor to and
from each firm size relative to an economy without frictions. In addition, distortions to
the magnitude of adjustments induced by per-worker or search frictions further divert
inflows away from their frictionless destination. By obstructing these firm-size flows, la-
bor market frictions distort aggregate employment, since the latter is proportional to the
mean of the firm-size distribution.
In general, however, the flows to and from each position in the firm-size distribution
are functions of the employment level at each position, and are thus complicated ob-
jects to distil. We show in Section 1 how it is possible to devise a single summary statistic
for the behavior of the firm-size flows which, in theory, provides a diagnostic for their
aggregate effects. This summary statistic is the mean of a notional firm-size distribution
associated with flow balance; that is, the distribution that equates inflows to outflows
at each employment level. We show that a robust implication of canonical models is
that aggregate flow-balance employment exhibits an overshooting property relative to
its frictionless counterpart, rising more than frictionless employment in aggregate ex-
pansions, and declining more in recessions. This behavior of flow-balance employment
reflects the fast-moving dynamics of the firm-size flows.4
2In this sense, our work is similar in spirit to Bils, Klenow, and Malin (2012) who use microdata on price
adjustments to assess the propagation mechanism in monetary DSGE models.
3Moreover, to the extent that our results call into question the microfoundations of canonical labor mar-
ket frictions, they suggest caution in carrying out policy analysis using these theories. Understanding the
nature of the underlying frictions is a key task for future research.
4These fast-moving dynamics of the firm-size flows are reminiscent of earlier findings in related liter-
ature on price and capital frictions. For example, Calvo models of price setting, in which the adjustment
probability is an exogenous constant, fail to capture the sluggishness of average price changes, that is, ag-
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This overshooting property is quite general and is shaped by two economic forces:
a partial equilibrium effect that holds in the absence of adjustment of wages, and a fur-
ther equilibrium effect induced by such wage adjustment. In partial equilibrium, the
response of aggregate flow-balance employment to a positive aggregate shock captures
a rightward shift in the distribution of desired employment, just as aggregate friction-
less employment does. In addition, it reflects an increased propensity of firms to adjust
to versus from high employment levels; the elasticity of these cross-sectional flows is a
critical component of the model’s dynamics. Consequently, mean flow-balance employ-
ment responds at least as much as its frictionless counterpart to aggregate shocks.
Equilibrium wage adjustment reinforces this property. Consider a rise in aggregate
labor productivity. To the extent that labor market frictions attenuate the response of la-
bor demand, equilibrium wages will rise less in the presence of frictions than in their ab-
sence. Hence, aggregate flow-balance employment is conditional on a smaller increase
in wages. Equivalently, the rise in equilibrium frictionless employment is choked off to
a greater extent by rises in wages. For this reason, the equilibrium response of aggregate
flow-balance employment is further amplified relative to its frictionless counterpart.
We confirm these properties of canonical models in two sets of complementary re-
sults. The first establishes analytical results for popular special cases of the models in
which frictionless labor demand evolves within each firm according to a random walk,
and aggregate disturbances are unanticipated and permanent. The second explores nu-
merical simulations that relax these assumptions. These theoretical results reveal that
models in this class, especially variants with linear and search frictions, can induce sig-
nificant propagation in aggregate employment dynamics. However, at the same time, all
such models imply considerable overshooting of flow-balance employment relative to
frictionless employment. Importantly, this overshooting property holds quite generally
for a wide array of parameterizations of the persistence and volatility of idiosyncratic
shocks, and of the magnitude of adjustment frictions. Since there remains some uncer-
tainty in the literature over these parameters, and how they might separately be identi-
fied, the generality of the result is especially useful.
The upshot of Section 1, then, is that frictions in this class may distort the path of ag-
gregate employment, but only by virtue of their ability to restrain the flow of labor across
firms. However, while such frictions dampen the level of the cross-sectional flows, these
flows are predicted to be highly elastic to aggregate shocks. A consequence is that em-
ployment under flow balance responds to shocks even more aggressively than its fric-
tionless counterpart. A natural question is whether available data are consistent with
such a stark response of firm-size flows, as summarized by aggregate flow-balance em-
ployment.
In Section 2, we confront these implications of canonical models with empirical
counterparts measured using rich establishment microdata. The data we use are de-
rived from the US Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for the period 1992Q1
gregate inflation (Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Mankiw and Reis (2002)). Similarly, Veracierto’s (2002) early
study of the special case of irreversible investment found numerically that the model failed to capture the
sluggishness of average capital changes—aggregate investment. (See also Christiano and Todd (1996).) Our
results show analytically that the origins of such findings lie in the behavior of firm-size flows, can be gen-
eralized to a much wider class of frictions, and can be tested using microdata on firm dynamics.
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through to 2014Q2. Being a natural establishment panel, these data enable us to observe
the outflows from, and inflows to, each employment level in the employer-size distribu-
tion. Accordingly, we can derive an empirical measure of aggregate employment implied
by flow balance along the lines suggested by the theoretical work of Section 1.
Using this measure, we present the results of several exercises that assess the empir-
ical relevance of the propagation mechanism in this class of models. An initial, revealing
finding is that the empirical time series for aggregate flow-balance employment tracks
very closely the time series for actual, observed aggregate employment. Intuitively, it is
hard to reconcile such an observation with the prediction of this class of models that
flow-balance employment must overshoot its frictionless (let alone its observed) coun-
terpart.
We formalize this intuition in three further empirical exercises. For all of them, we
begin by selecting a parameterization of the adjustment frictions that replicates the slug-
gishness of observed aggregate employment. We find that a relatively large linear friction
is needed to achieve this.
The first exercise then finds a sequence of aggregate shocks to match the empirical
time series of observed aggregate employment in our data, and compares the model-
implied series for flow-balance employment with its analogue in the data. Consistent
with the above intuition, the model-implied series for flow-balance employment is
much more volatile than its empirical counterpart, exhibiting around 50% more peak-
to-trough variation around recessions.
The second exercise provides a further illustration of this result by comparing the dy-
namic correlations between aggregate flow-balance employment and labor productivity
in model and data. By construction, the parameterized model generates an impulse re-
sponse of actual observed employment to labor productivity that resembles its sluggish,
hump-shaped analogue in the data. However, while the empirical impulse response of
flow-balance employment is only modestly less persistent and hump-shaped than that
for actual employment, the model-implied response exhibits very volatile, jump dynam-
ics with respect to labor productivity.
In a final exercise, we directly compare impulse responses of measures of the inflows
to, and outflows from, three employment size classes in both model and data. Qualita-
tively consistent with models that feature canonical frictions, positive innovations to
output-per-worker in the data are associated with an increase in the share of firms ad-
justing to, rather than from, higher employment levels. But, in stark contrast to the pre-
dictions of such models, the empirical impulse responses of firm-size flows are sluggish,
hump-shaped, and an order of magnitude smaller than their model-implied counter-
parts. This finding confirms that the differences between model-implied and observed
flow-balance employment can be traced to the fast-moving dynamics of the firm-size
flows under canonical frictions.
The results of these exercises form the basis of our conclusion that canonical mod-
els provide a poor account of the propagation mechanism underlying observed employ-
ment persistence. In the concluding section of the paper, we speculate on potential res-
olutions of this failure. We first revisit an earlier literature on convex adjustment costs.
Such convex costs are well known to induce sluggish macroeconomic dynamics. We find
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that they can also impart some persistence to firm-size flows, suggesting a novel microe-
conomic justification for convex costs. However, the magnitude of convex costs required
to deliver this result conflicts starkly with prior evidence. A broader lesson, though, is
that economic forces that dampen changes in labor demand among adjusters may rec-
oncile our findings.
Accordingly, we consider alternative resolutions that capture these economic forces
while building on the canonical (nonconvex) frictions of Section 1. We suggest one ex-
ample in which costs of adjusting employment interact with information frictions.5 A
distinctive feature of canonical labor market frictions is that they render employment
decisions partially irreversible. Consequently, information frictions induce a natural sig-
nal extraction problem whereby firms adjust to aggregate disturbances to the extent that
they are perceived to be permanent, and render desired employment flows sluggish, as
we observe in establishment microdata.
1. Labor market frictions and firm size dynamics
In this section, we first formalize the observation that canonical labor market frictions
affect aggregate employment by impeding the flow of firms across different firm sizes.
We then use the implied structure of these firm size dynamics to motivate a summary
statistic for their behavior, which enables us to characterize tractably key properties of
canonical models. Another virtue of this measure that we take up in later sections is that
it can be measured directly from establishment microdata.
1.1 Fixed costs
A leading model of labor market frictions postulates the presence of a fixed cost of ad-
justing employment, independent of the scale of adjustment. The early work of Hamer-
mesh (1989) suggests that such a friction could account for important features of es-
tablishment employment dynamics, an observation that informed the later influential
empirical analyses of Caballero and Engel (1993) and Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger
(1997).6
The case of a fixed cost is a natural starting place, not only in view of its promi-
nence in the literature, but also because it provides a setting in which to convey our
approach, and the intuition behind our results, most easily. As we shall see, the key in-
sights will carry over to other canonical models. In what follows, we first review the well-
understood distortions of firms’ labor demand policies induced by this friction. More
importantly for our purposes, we use this to infer the implications for firm size flows,
and thereby aggregate employment.
With regard to the structure of labor demand, the key implication of a fixed
cost is that employment will be adjusted only intermittently and, upon adjustment,
5This builds on and borrows from related ideas in recent literature that integrates menu costs of price
adjustment and information frictions (e.g., Gorodnichenko (2010), Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2011)).
6See also King and Thomas (2006), Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007, 2015), and Bachmann (2012).
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Figure 1. Ss policies in the presence of adjustment frictions.
discretely—adjustment will be “lumpy.” Thus, labor demand takes the form of a thresh-
old “Ss” policy, illustrated in Figure 1A:
n=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
n∗ if n∗ >U(n−1)
n−1 if n∗ ∈
[
L(n−1)U(n−1)
]

n∗ if n∗ <L(n−1)
(1)
Here, n∗ is the level of employment that a firm chooses if it adjusts. Under the Ss
policy, a firm’s current employment n is adjusted away from its past level n−1 whenever
n∗ deviates sufficiently from n−1, as dictated by the triggers L(n−1) < n−1 <U(n−1).
Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997) refer to n∗ as mandated employment,
interpreted as the level of employment the firm would choose if the friction were sus-
pended for the current period. In principle, the latter is distinct from frictionless em-
ployment, which emerges if the fixed cost is suspended indefinitely. For reasonably cali-
brated models within this canonical class, however, the dynamics of mandated and fric-
tionless employment are very similar.7 Henceforth, then we shall refer to n∗ as friction-
less or desired employment.
The dynamics of aggregate employment implied by the firm behavior in equation (1)
can be inferred from its implications for firm size flows. Imagine the economy enters the
period with a density of past employment, h−1(·), and that realizations of idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks induce a density of desired employment h∗(·). Our strategy is to
infer a law of motion for the current-period density h(·) implied by equation (1). This in
7This has been proved analytically for the case of a plausibly small fixed adjustment cost (Gertler and
Leahy (2008), Elsby and Michaels (2019)). In the Appendix in the Online Supplementary Material (Elsby,
Michaels, and Ratner (2019)), we also verify numerically that the distinction between frictionless and man-
dated employment is quantitatively inconsequential for the results we report below.
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turn will imply a path for aggregate employment in the economy, which we denote by
N , since the latter is captured by the mean of the density, N ≡ ∫ mh(m)dm.
The adjustment policy in Figure 1A suggests a straightforward approach to con-
structing a law of motion for the firm-size density h(·). Consider first the outflow of mass
from some employment level m. Among the h−1(m) mass of firms that enter the period
with m workers, only the fraction whose desired employment n∗ lies outside the inaction
region [L(m)U(m)] will choose to incur the adjustment cost and leave the mass. Sym-
metrically, now consider the inflow of mass to employment level m. Among the h∗(m)
mass of firms whose desired employment is equal to m, only the fraction whose inher-
ited employment n−1 lies outside of the inverse inaction region [U−1(m)L−1(m)] will
choose to incur the adjustment cost and flow to m. Thus, the change in the mass at em-
ployment level m follows the law of motion
h(m)= τ(m)h∗(m)−φ(m)h−1(m) (2)
where τ(m) and φ(m) are respectively the probabilities of adjusting to and from an em-
ployment level m,
τ(m)= Pr(n−1 /∈ [U−1(m)L−1(m)]|n∗ =m) and
φ(m)= Pr(n∗ /∈ [L(m)U(m)]|n−1 =m) (3)
Formal derivations of equations (2) and (3) are provided in the Appendix.
The role of frictions in shaping the evolution of aggregate employment is evident in
equations (2) and (3). In the absence of frictions, the probabilities of adjusting to and
from m are given by τ(m)= 1 =φ(m). Hence, (2) collapses to h(m)= h∗(m)− h−1(m):
any gap between the initial and frictionless densities is closed immediately. Thus, fric-
tions distort the path of the firm size density, and thereby aggregate employment, by
impeding the flows of labor across firms, in the sense that τ(m), φ(m) ∈ (0,1).
1.2 An empirical diagnostic
With this theoretical law of motion in hand, our next step is to consider which of
its components can be measured empirically using available data. As we shall see,
establishment-level panel data allow one to observe much of equation (2): One can mea-
sure the mass at each employment level at each point in time, h−1(m) and h(m); one can
also observe the fraction of establishments at each employment level that adjusts away,
φ(m), as well as the total inflow, τ(m)h∗(m).8
Our point of departure is to note that, for fixed adjustment rates τ(m) and φ(m),
the firm size density will converge to a position where the inflow of mass to each m is
8That we can observe only the total inflow, τ(m)h∗(m), rather than its constituent parts, is of course a
perennial identification problem in this literature. If one could measure both τ(m) and h∗(m), the latter
would allow one to infer a measure of aggregate frictionless employment N∗ ≡ ∫ mh∗(m)dm. Comparison
of N∗ with the observed path of actual aggregate employment N would then indicate the wedge between
these two induced by the adjustment friction.
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balanced by outflows from that point. This flow balance condition implies a density
hˆ(m)≡ τ(m)
φ(m)
h∗(m) (4)
hˆ(m) is useful for several reasons. First, it can be measured straightforwardly, since
it requires knowledge only of the total inflow, τ(m)h∗(m), and the probability of outflow
φ(m), both of which are observed in establishment panel data.
Second, we argue in what follows that the mean of the flow balance density offers a
single summary statistic that conveys the effects of canonical frictions on the dynam-
ics of firm-size flows, and thereby on the dynamics of aggregate employment. Specif-
ically, note that, using (4), the aggregate employment level implied by flow balance,
Nˆ ≡ ∫ mhˆ(m)dm, can be written as
Nˆ =N∗ + covh∗
(
m
τ(m)
φ(m)
)
 (5)
where covh∗ denotes a covariance taken with respect to the distribution of frictionless
employment, h∗(m).
Equation (5) reveals that aggregate employment under flow balance Nˆ will overshoot
the path of aggregate frictionless employment N∗ under a monotonicity condition—
namely that firms on average are more likely to adjust to versus from high (low) employ-
ment levels following positive (negative) innovations to aggregate frictionless employ-
ment. This implies that, after a positive innovation, τ(m)/φ(m) will decline for low m
(since fewer firms adjust to versus from low m) and rise for high m (since more firms
adjust to versus from high m). Thus, τ(m)/φ(m) “tilts up” with respect to m, raising the
covariance term in (5). Under this condition, Nˆ will rise more than N∗ when the latter
rises, and fall more than N∗ when it falls.
The monotonicity condition that underlies this intuition is closely related to the se-
lection effect that has been emphasized in the literature on adjustment frictions (Ca-
ballero and Engel (2007) and Golosov and Lucas (2007)). This refers to a property shared
by state-dependent models of adjustment whereby the firms that adjust tend to be those
with the greatest desired adjustment. By the same token, firms in these models also will
adjust in the direction of the desired adjustment.
The forgoing intuition can be formalized tractably in standard models of fixed ad-
justment frictions, such as that set out in Caballero and Engel (1999). In this environ-
ment, firms face an isoelastic production function y = pxnα that is subject to idiosyn-
cratic shocks x. Firms thus face the following decision problem:
Π(n−1x)≡max
n
{
pxnα −wn−C+I[n > n−1] −C−I[n < n−1] +βE
[
Π
(
nx′
)|x]} (6)
where p denotes (for now, fixed) aggregate productivity, w the wage, and C+/− the fixed
costs of adjusting employment up and down.
Caballero and Engel (1999) showed that, if idiosyncratic shocks follow a geometric
random walk, lnx′ = lnx + ε′x, and the adjustment costs C+/− are scaled to be propor-
tional to the firm’s frictionless labor costs, the labor demand problem has a tractable
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homogeneity property. This has two useful implications: First, the adjustment triggers
in (1) are linear and time invariant, L(n−1)=L · n−1 and U(n−1)=U · n−1 for constants
L< 1<U . Second, desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(n∗/n−1), are independent
of initial firm size n−1.9
Proposition 1 uses these properties of the canonical model to formalize the heuris-
tic claim above that changes in aggregate employment under flow balance overshoot
changes in aggregate frictionless employment. It assumes firms perceive aggregate pro-
ductivity p as fixed, and characterizes comparative statics with respect to a (one-time)
change in p. Because of the model’s loglinear structure, the result is most simply derived
in terms of aggregate log frictionless employment, which we shall denote by N ∗, and its
counterpart under flow balance, Nˆ .
Proposition 1. Consider the model of fixed adjustment costs (6). To a first-order ap-
proximation around a small change in aggregate log frictionless employment N ∗, the
change in aggregate log employment under flow balance, relative to a prior constant-N ∗
steady state, is
Nˆ ≈ 1− w
1− w∗ · (1+ψ) ·N
∗ (7)
where ψ > 0, and w and w∗ are the elasticities, respectively with and without frictions,
of equilibriumwages to aggregate productivity p.
In Proposition 1, the response of Nˆ overshoots the frictionless response of N ∗ for
two reasons. The first is a partial equilibrium response: even if w = w∗ = 0, Proposi-
tion 1 indicates that the change in aggregate log employment under flow balance strictly
overshoots its frictionless counterpart This reflects the intuition conveyed by equation
(5) that increases in desired employment N ∗ are augmented in Nˆ by increases in the
propensity to adjust toward higher employment levels. Put another way, frictions induce
a “pent-up” demand for adjusting, such that the propensity to adjust reacts sharply after
aggregate shocks and leads Nˆ to overshoot N ∗.
In addition, Proposition 1 reveals how differential equilibrium wage responses re-
inforce this overshooting property still further. To the extent that adjustment frictions
restrict the response of labor demand to an aggregate shock, they also will restrict the
response of equilibrium wages for a given labor supply schedule, w < w∗ . It follows that
(1− w)/(1− w∗) > 1, further amplifying the equilibrium employment response under
flow balance.
While Proposition 1 has a number of virtues—it holds irrespective of whether ad-
justment is symmetric (C+ = C−) or asymmetric (C+ = C−), for example—it also has
limitations. It relies on the homogeneity of the canonical model implied by the assump-
tion that idiosyncratic productivity, x, follows a random walk. It is also a comparative
statics result, describing the response of the economy to a change in aggregate labor
demand, indexed by p, that is expected to occur with zero probability from the firms’
perspectives. For these reasons, in the next subsection, we explore the robustness of the
overshooting result in numerical simulations that relax these assumptions.
9The Appendix provides a formal statement and proof of this result in Lemma 1.
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1.3 Quantitative illustrations
We illustrate the dynamics of fixed costs models that resemble the canonical model de-
scribed above, but with two differences. First, we relax the random walk assumption on
idiosyncratic shocks, which we allow to follow a geometric AR(1),
lnx′ = ρx lnx+ ε′x where ε′x ∼N
(
0σ2x
)
 (8)
Second, we allow for the presence of aggregate productivity shocks, and for their
stochastic process to be known to firms in the model. The evolution of these aggregate
shocks also is assumed to follow a geometric AR(1),
lnp′ = ρp lnp+ ε′p where ε′p ∼N
(
0σ2p
)
 (9)
To mirror the timing of the data we use later in the paper, a period is taken to be one
quarter. Based on this, we set the discount factor β to 099, consistent with an annual
interest rate of around 4%. To parameterize the remainder of the model, we appeal to
the empirical literature that estimates closely related models of firm dynamics.
The returns-to-scale parameter α is set to 064, as in the estimates of Cooper, Halti-
wanger, and Willis (2007, 2015).
The choice of parameters of the idiosyncratic productivity shock process (8) is in-
formed by the estimates of Abraham and White (2006). They estimate a quarterly persis-
tence parameter ρx of approximately 07, which we implement. Our choice of the stan-
dard deviation of the idiosyncratic innovation ε′x of σx = 015 is set a little higher than
Abraham and White’s estimate of 010, since the latter lies at the lower end of the range of
estimates in the literature. The Appendix derives these quarterly parameters from Abra-
ham and White’s annual estimates and contrasts them with other estimates of ρx and
σx reported in related literature. The results are very similar to those described in what
follows (see Figure B in the Online Appendix).
The parameters of the process for aggregate technology in (9) are chosen so that ag-
gregate frictionless employment in the model exhibits a persistence and volatility com-
parable to aggregate employment in US data. This yields ρp = 095 and σp = 0018. Al-
though frictions augment persistence, and dampen volatility, the intent is for the model
environment to resemble broadly the US labor market with respect to these uncondi-
tional moments. Importantly, the approach does not build in any persistence in em-
ployment conditional on technology.
Finally, with respect to the adjustment cost, here we report results for the case of
symmetric frictions, C+ = C−, the most common choice in the literature (see, e.g.,
Bloom (2009)). We explore three parameterizations that successively raise the friction to
replicate a range of inaction rates. In the data used later in the paper, the observed frac-
tion of firms that do not adjust employment quarter to quarter averages 525%. We find
that a fixed cost equal to 13% of quarterly revenue replicates this inaction rate. However,
we also consider fixed costs that induce higher inaction rates, for two reasons. First, the
latter calibration lies at the lower end of available estimates of fixed costs (Bloom (2009)
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and Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007, 2015)). Second, consistent with this, inac-
tion rates measured at a year-to-year frequency lie closer to 40%, much higher than im-
plied by a naïve extrapolation of the quarterly inaction rate. A natural explanation for
this fact is that some quarter-to-quarter shifts in employment reflect quits, which are
subsequently replaced, rather than “active” employment adjustments that are subject
to frictions and are the focus of canonical models. For these reasons, we also explore
larger fixed costs that imply quarterly inaction rates of 67% and 80%. These correspond
to adjustment costs of 27% and 58% of quarterly revenue, respectively, which also lie
in the range of estimates in the literature.
We solve the labor demand problem via value function iteration on an integer-
valued employment grid, n ∈ {123    }. The latter mirrors the integer constraint in the
data, allowing one to construct the density hˆ(·) in the simulated data in the same way as
we later implement in the real data.
To simulate equilibrium wage responses, we impose an aggregate labor supply
schedule. Based on the estimates of Chetty (2012) and Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber
(2012), we parameterize the labor supply function to have a (constant) Frisch elasticity
of 05.10 We maintain the same elasticity in the frictionless model. Chetty has argued
that longer-run labor supply responses (e.g., Hicksian elasticities), which are arguably
less influenced by frictions, imply a Frisch elasticity that is still no more than 05.
To solve the model, we implement the bounded rationality algorithm of Krusell and
Smith (1998), whereby firms condition their labor demands on a linear forecast rule that
relates log aggregate employment to its lag and aggregate productivity. We then iterate
on the coefficients of this forecast rule until the firms’ simulated choices are consistent
with the rule.
Figure 2 plots simulated impulse responses of aggregate employment N , together
with its frictionless and flow-balance counterparts, N∗ and Nˆ respectively. The over-
shooting result anticipated in Proposition 1 is clearly visible in the model dynamics. For
all three parameterizations of the adjustment cost our proposed diagnostic, Nˆ , responds
more aggressively to the aggregate shock than frictionless employment N∗. Moreover,
the magnitude of the overshooting of Nˆ relative to N∗ is substantial in the model, re-
sponding on impact around twice as much to the impulse.
These results provide a first example of how canonical frictions have clear predic-
tions on the dynamics of firm size flows, as summarized by the dynamics of Nˆ—namely,
that they respond aggressively to aggregate shocks. Since these firm size flows reflect the
channel through which frictions distort the path of aggregate employment, observable
measures of such flows can be used to assess the empirical relevance of the propagation
mechanism implied by canonical frictions. The next subsections extend this insight to
two other popular models of labor market frictions.
10Using survey questions about the long-run response to hypothetical wealth windfalls, Kimball and
Shapiro (2010) estimated a median Frisch elasticity of 06 and a mean of 1. Consistent with Proposition 1,
we have verified that aggregate employment under flow balance overshoots its frictionless counterpart even
in the latter parameterization. Results are available on request.
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Figure 2. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: fixed costs.
1.4 Linear costs
Prominent alternative models of labor market frictions appeal instead to linear costs of
adjustment in which the friction is discrete at the margin, and rises with the scale of ad-
justment. This class encompasses models of per-worker hiring and firing costs, includ-
ing the contributions of Oi (1962), Nickell (1978), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Hopen-
hayn and Rogerson (1993), and Veracierto (2008). The case of linear adjustment costs
is especially important to examine since, as we shall see, these costs can induce more
realistic sluggishness in aggregate employment than fixed costs.
Relative to the fixed costs case, linear frictions alter the structure of both labor de-
mand and firm size dynamics. Although labor demand will continue to feature intermit-
tent adjustment, a key difference is that, conditional on adjusting, firms will no longer
discretely set employment to their frictionless target n∗. Rather, they will reduce the
magnitude of hires and separations, shedding fewer workers when they shrink, and hir-
ing fewer workers when they expand. Formally, the policy rule for separations, which we
shall denote by l(·), will differ from the policy rule used for hiring, denoted u(·), inducing
the continuous Ss policy illustrated in Figure 1B,
n=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
u−1
(
n∗
)
if n∗ > u(n−1)
n−1 if n∗ ∈
[
l(n−1)u(n−1)
]

l−1
(
n∗
)
if n∗ < l(n−1)
(10)
where l(n−1) < n−1 < u(n−1) for all n−1.
The key distinction, that the direction of adjustment must be taken into account in
the presence of linear costs, also leaves its imprint on the law of motion for the firm size
distribution. As before, the labor demand policy in Figure 1B motivates the form of this
law of motion. This reveals that the structure of outflows is qualitatively unchanged—of
the h−1(m) density of firms currently at employment level m, only those with frictionless
employment outside the inaction region [l(m)u(m)] will adjust away. But inflows are
now differentiated by the direction of adjustment. The inflow of mass adjusting down
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to m is comprised of firms whose past employment n−1 is greater than m, and whose
frictionless employment n∗ is equal to l(m) <m. Likewise, the inflow of mass flowing up
to m consists of firms with n−1 <m and n∗ = u(m) >m.
Piecing this logic together yields the following law of motion for the firm size density:
h(m)= τl(m)h∗l (m)+ τu(m)h∗u(m)−φ(m)h−1(m) (11)
Extending the interpretation of the fixed costs case above, here h∗l (m) = l′(m) ×
h∗(l(m)) and h∗u(m) = u′(m)h∗(u(m)) are the densities of employment that would
emerge if all firms adjusted, respectively, according to the separation rule, l(m), and
hiring rule, u(m). However, only a fraction of firms will in fact adjust. The adjustment
probabilities take the form
τl(m)= Pr
(
n−1 >m|n∗ = l(m)
)

τu(m)= Pr
(
n−1 <m|n∗ = u(m)
)
and
φ(m)= Pr(n∗ /∈ [l(m)u(m)]|n−1 =m)
(12)
where τl(m) is the probability that a firm adjusts down to m, while τu(m) is the proba-
bility that a firm adjusts up to m.
To construct the density under flow balance for the linear costs case note that, for
fixed adjustment rates τl(m), τu(m), and φ(m), the law of motion (11) implies that the
firm size density will converge to
hˆ(m)≡ τl(m)
φ(m)
h∗l (m)+
τu(m)
φ(m)
h∗u(m) (13)
Like its counterpart (4) in the case of fixed costs, equation (13) offers a glimpse into
the behavior of aggregate employment under flow balance, Nˆ ≡ ∫ mhˆ(m)dm. The flow-
balance density hˆ(m) is again related both to the propensities to adjust, τl(m), τu(m),
and φ(m), and to the densities of “desired” employment conditional on adjusting, h∗l (m)
and h∗u(m). As in the case of fixed costs, changes in the propensities to adjust following
an aggregate shock will tend to amplify the response of employment under flow bal-
ance relative to the frictionless benchmark that lacks intermittent adjustment. However,
what is new is that the presence of a linear cost implies that, conditional on adjusting,
employment responds less aggressively than the frictionless benchmark. Under certain
conditions, we can characterize the relative strength of these two opposing forces.
Once again, further insight can be gained if we consider a canonical linear cost
model in which firms face isoelastic production y = pxnα, and idiosyncratic shocks that
follow a geometric random walk.11 The key difference is that the adjustment friction is
11Nickell (1978, 1986) first formalized the linear-cost model in the context of a labor demand model.
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) introduced uncertainty into Nickell’s continuous-time formulation. Equation
(14) is a discrete-time analogue to Bentolila and Bertola’s model (although the shocks need not be Gaussian,
as in their paper).
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now scaled by the magnitude of adjustment, so that firms face the decision problem:12
Π(n−1x)≡max
n
{
pxnα −wn− c+n+ + c−n− +βE[Π(nx′)|x]} (14)
A simple extension of Caballero and Engel’s (1999) homogeneity results for the fixed
cost model can be used to show that if idiosyncratic shocks follow a geometric random
walk, and if per-worker hiring and firing costs are proportional to wages, the adjustment
triggers in (10) are linear and time invariant, l(n) = l · n and u(n) = u · n for constants
l < 1< u, and that desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(n∗/n−1), are independent
of initial firm size n−1.13
As in Proposition 1 above for the fixed costs case, the latter properties allow one
to relate the response of aggregate flow-balance log employment Nˆ to the response of
aggregate frictionless log employment N ∗ following a change in aggregate productivity.
Proposition 2. Consider the model of linear adjustment costs (14). To a first-order ap-
proximation around a small change in aggregate log frictionless employment N ∗, the
change in aggregate log employment under flow balance, relative to a prior constant-N ∗
steady state, is
Nˆ ≈ 1− w
1− w∗ ·N
∗ (15)
where w and w∗ are the elasticities, respectively with and without frictions, of equilib-
rium wages to aggregate productivity p.
Just as in the model of fixed costs, the response of Nˆ relative to N ∗ is shown to be
mediated by the wage elasticities w and w∗ , and is qualitatively independent of any
asymmetries in the frictions c+ = c−. In contrast to the fixed costs case, though, the ex-
tent to which Nˆ overshoots the frictionless response of N ∗ now depends entirely on the
response of equilibrium wages.
For fixed wages, the response of Nˆ no longer overshoots that of N ∗, but is approx-
imately equal to it. The key difference is that firms adjust only partially toward their
frictionless employment under linear frictions. A rise in N ∗ places more firms on the hir-
ing margin, where employment is set below its frictionless counterpart, and fewer firms
on the separation margin, where employment exceeds its frictionless level. Both forces
serve to attenuate the response of Nˆ relative to the fixed costs case. Proposition 2 shows
that, to a first order, this attenuation offsets exactly the partial equilibrium overshooting
of the diagnostic Nˆ in the fixed costs case.
The effects of differential equilibrium wage responses remain as before, however.
Sluggish frictional responses of labor demand to an aggregate shock will induce sluggish
equilibrium wage responses under frictions, such that w < w∗ . This again gives rise to
overshooting, as shown in Proposition 2.
12We use n+ and n− as shorthand for nI[n > n−1] and nI[n < n−1], respectively.
13Again, the Appendix provides a formal statement and proof of this result in Lemma 1.
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Figure 3. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: linear costs.
Figures 3 and 4 show that the result of Proposition 2 is mirrored in numerical sim-
ulations of models that incorporate a general stationary process for idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity, x, and a fully stochastic process for aggregate productivity, p. We again present
results for three parameterizations of the friction, each of which induces a different inac-
tion rate. As with the fixed costs case above, the online Appendix provides further results
that vary the persistence and volatility of idiosyncratic shocks, ρx and σx. The results are
again very similar to those described here (see Figure C). The numerical methods and
the details of the calibration strategy are as described in Section 1.3.
Figure 3 illustrates impulse responses of actual, frictionless, and flow-balance aggre-
gate employment in the presence of symmetric linear frictions where c+ = c−. As before,
each panel of Figure 3 successively raises the friction to produce increasingly higher av-
erage rates of inaction in employment adjustment. Note that the response of actual em-
ployment becomes progressively more sluggish as the friction rises, which dampens the
response of the wage. As foreshadowed by Proposition 2, the response of flow-balance
employment therefore increasingly overshoots the frictionless path.
Figure 4 in turn reveals that this result is unimpaired by the presence of asymmetric
frictions, as suggested by Proposition 2. Its first three panels report results for succes-
sively higher hiring costs, c+ > 0 and c− = 0; the latter three panels do the same for firing
costs, c− > 0 and c+ = 0. Strikingly, it is hard to discern differences between the impulse
responses for hiring and firing costs, and between these and the impulse response for
the symmetric case in Figure 3.
The message of Figures 3 and 4 then is that the insight of Proposition 2 is robust to
empirically reasonable parameterizations of canonical models of linear frictions. This
reinforces the message of Section 1.3 that flow balance employment is indeed a use-
ful summary statistic for the impact of canonical frictions on firm size dynamics, and
thereby the effects of such frictions on aggregate employment dynamics.
However, Proposition 2 does not allow the adjustment triggers to vary, since these
are independent of N ∗ under the time-invariant linear frictions we have considered
thus far. This is a key distinction with respect to models of search frictions, to which we
now turn.
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Figure 4. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: asymmetric linear costs.
1.5 Search costs
The canonical Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) model of search frictions, in
which a single firm matches with a single worker, can be extended to a setting with
“large” firms that operate a decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology (Ace-
moglu and Hawkins (2014), Elsby and Michaels (2013)). The presence of search frictions
implies two modifications to the canonical linear cost model studied above.
First, search frictions induce a time-varying per-worker hiring cost. Hiring is me-
diated through vacancies, each of which is subject to a flow cost c, and is filled with a
probability q that depends on the aggregate state of the labor market. Under a law of
large numbers, the effective per-worker hiring cost is thus c/q, which varies over time
with the vacancy-filling rate q. The typical firm’s problem therefore takes the form:
Π(n−1x)≡max
n
{
pxnα −w(nx)n− c
q
n+ +βE[Π(nx′)|x]
}
 (16)
Second, search frictions induce ex post rents to employment relationships over
which a firm and its workers may bargain. In an extension of the bilateral Nash sharing
rule invoked in standard one-worker-one-firm search models, Elsby and Michaels (2013)
showed that a marginal surplus-sharing rule proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) im-
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plies a wage equation of the form
w(nx)= η pxαn
α−1
1−η(1− α) + (1−η)ω (17)
Here, η ∈ [01] indexes worker bargaining power, and ω is the annuitized value
of workers’ threat point. Bruegemann, Gautier, and Menzio (2019) showed that the
marginal surplus-sharing rule underlying (17) can be derived from an alternating-offers
bargaining game between a firm and its many workers in which the strategic position of
each worker in the firm is symmetric.
As before, we consider first a version of the search model with a tractable homo-
geneity property. Specifically, we study the case in which the friction, embodied in the
vacancy cost, is proportional to the workers’ outside option, c ∝ γω.14 Under these as-
sumptions, the Appendix shows that the homogeneity properties used for the models
discussed in previous subsections continue to hold, with one exception: although the
adjustment triggers remain linear, they no longer are invariant to shifts in aggregate pro-
ductivity, for the simple reason that the friction, c/q, varies with the aggregate state.
Proposition 3 reveals that the result of Proposition 2 extends to search frictions, un-
der a few restrictions.
Proposition 3. Consider the model of search costs in (16) and (17). Assume (i) firms are
patient, β≈ 1; (ii) frictions are small, γ2 ≈ 0; and (iii) the distribution of εx is symmetric.
Then, to a first-order approximation around a small change in aggregate log frictionless
employment N ∗, the change in aggregate log employment under flow balance, relative
to a prior constant-N ∗ steady state, is
Nˆ ≈ 1− ω
1− w∗ N
∗ (18)
where ω and w∗ are the elasticities of ω and frictionless wages w∗ to aggregate produc-
tivity p.
As in earlier results, Proposition 3 suggests that the responses of Nˆ and N ∗ are
shaped by both partial equilibrium and equilibrium forces, which we consider in turn.
In partial equilibrium, Proposition 3 shows that the response of aggregate employ-
ment under flow balance Nˆ still approximates the response of aggregate log frictionless
employment N ∗, but under a few additional restrictions. We argue in what follows that
these restrictions are plausible.
The first two restrictions—that firms are patient, and that frictions are small—are
quantitative. We address their plausibility by examining results from a numerical model
that does not impose these restrictions. This model sets the discount factor β to match
an annual interest rate of 4%, and sets c to match evidence on recruitment costs. The
14This can be motivated through the presence of a dual labor market in which recruitment is performed
by workers hired in a competitive market, who are paid according to the annuitized value of unemployment
ω.
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numerical results will thus address the extent to which β is close enough to one, and the
friction sufficiently small, for the insight of Proposition 3 to hold.
The third restriction concerns the symmetry of the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks. This can be justified along two grounds. First, it is conventional to implement
shock processes with symmetrically distributed—typically Normal—innovations. Sec-
ond, it is also consistent with the observed pattern of employment adjustment, which
is close to symmetric (see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Elsby and Michaels (2013),
among others).
These three restrictions aid the proof of Proposition 3, which is based on symmetry.
If the firm is sufficiently patient (β ≈ 1), the cost of hiring in the current period implies
an equal cost of firing in the subsequent period. As a result, one can show that the op-
timal policy is symmetric, to a first-order approximation around γ = 0, as long as the
driving force εx is symmetric. In terms of the notation of the policy rules, this means
the upper and lower adjustment triggers, u(n−1) = u · n−1 and l(n−1) = l · n−1, satisfy
lnu ≈ − ln l, and move by approximately the same amount in response to a shift in ag-
gregate productivity.
As in preceding sections, we explore the robustness of the conclusion of our theo-
retical analysis by solving a numerical version of the model that relaxes the restrictions
used in deriving the proposition. The numerical model extends (16) slightly by includ-
ing a per-worker cost of hiring k (akin to c+ in (14)) that is independent of the aggregate
state of the labor market. Numerous authors have noted that a time-invariant cost of
hiring aids the ability of search and matching models to generate realistic degrees of
amplitude and persistence in employment (Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Pissarides
(2009), and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016)).
We again present results for three parameterizations, each one targeting a different
inaction rate. Details of our calibration strategy, as well as values of all structural param-
eters, can be found in the Appendix. Here, we describe the more salient structural pa-
rameters that underlie the elasticities, w∗ and ω, highlighted by Proposition 3. These
elasticities measure, respectively, the flexibility of frictionless wages w∗, and workers’
outside option in the presence of frictions ω, to aggregate productivity p.
As before, in the frictionless case w∗ is related to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
which we again set to 05. This implies w∗ = 2/(3 − α) ≈ 0848 when α is set to equal
0.64.15
The counterpart to w∗ in the search model, ω, depends on the structure of the
worker’s threat point ω, which in turn is shaped by the hiring costs faced by firms. These
include c, the vacancy cost, as well as k. The vacancy cost is set such that the average
cost of recruiting, c/q, equals 14% of the quarterly wage, following Hall and Milgrom
(2008) and Elsby and Michaels (2013). We then select the value of k to match the three
inaction rates studied in the preceding sections.
15Strictly speaking, labor supply is inelastic in the canonical search model, and so the elasticity that
would emerge absent frictions is zero. In general, though, the frictionless model is merely a static labor de-
mand schedule, taking a wage as given. Accordingly, and keeping with Sections 1.2 and 1.3, we benchmark
against a more compelling frictionless alternative where the wage is consistent with a Frisch elasticity of
05.
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Figure 5. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: search costs.
Given this structure, a simple extension of the “large-firm” wage bargain imple-
mented in Elsby and Michaels (2013) to this environment implies that
ω= η
1−η
(
cθ+ kf(θ))+ b (19)
where θ is labor market tightness, the ratio of aggregate vacancies to unemployment,
f (θ) is the job-finding rate, and b is the flow payoff to unemployment. Intuitively, since
firms would have to pay both vacancy and hiring costs to replace a worker, both frictions
act as a lever to raise his wage, and so both c and k enter into ω.
It remains to choose worker bargaining power, η. We pin this down based on evi-
dence from microdata on wages. Taking account of the shifting composition of employ-
ment over the business cycle, microdata-based estimates are broadly consistent with a
rule of thumb that real wages are about as cyclical as employment (Solon, Barsky, and
Parker (1994), Elsby, Shin, and Solon (2016)). Accordingly, we set η to match an elastic-
ity of average real wages with respect to aggregate employment approximately equal to
one. This choice, in turn, implies the elasticity of the workers’ threat point to aggregate
productivity, ω.
The implied magnitudes for ω are measured by the response of ω on impact of a
shock to p, consistent with the interpretation of Proposition 3. The results vary some-
what across the different parameterizations of the search friction. We find that ω lies
between 054 (when the frictions are set to induce an inaction rate of 525% per quarter)
and 049 (when the frictions induce an inaction rate of 80% per quarter).
Proposition 3 implies that the response of aggregate employment under flow bal-
ance should overshoot that of frictionless employment under these parameterizations,
since (1 − ω)/(1 − w∗) lies between 30 (in the case of a 525% inaction rate) and 33
(in the case of an 80% inaction rate). Figure 5 shows that this prediction of Proposi-
tion 3 is visible in numerical simulations of the model. As before, these are based on the
methods and baseline parameterization described in Section 1.3, that is, with stationary
idiosyncratic shocks x, and fully stochastic aggregate shocks p. The impulse responses
in Figure 5 suggest that aggregate employment under flow balance reacts on impact of
the aggregate shock considerably more than its frictionless counterpart.
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2. Empirical implementation
The previous section gave a theoretical rationale for how the aggregate effects of a class
of canonical frictions are mediated through their effects on the dynamics of firm size
flows, and how a summary statistic for these dynamics is provided by aggregate flow-
balance employment Nˆ . A key virtue of Nˆ is that it can be measured with access to es-
tablishment panel data on employment. In this section, we apply these results to a rich
source of microdata from the United States.
2.1 Data
The data we use are taken from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW). The QCEW is compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in concert with
State Employment Security Agencies. The latter collect data from all employers in a state
that are subject to the state’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws. Firms file quarterly UI
Contribution Reports to the state agency, which provide payroll counts of employment
in each month; the BLS further disaggregates to the establishment level as necessary
for multi-establishment firms. These are then aggregated by the BLS, which defines em-
ployment as the total number of workers on the establishment’s payroll during the pay
period that includes the 12th day of each month. Following BLS procedure, we define
quarterly employment as the level of employment in the third month of each quarter.16
From the cross-sectional QCEW data, the BLS constructs the Longitudinal Database
of Establishments (LDE), which we use in what follows. Although data are available for
the period 1990Q1 to 2014Q2, we restrict attention to data from 1992Q1 due to difficulty
in matching establishments in the first 2 years of the sample.17
Sample restrictions The QCEW data are a near-complete census of workers in the
United States, covering approximately 98% of employees on nonfarm payrolls. The dot-
ted line in Figure 6 plots the time series of log aggregate employment in private estab-
lishments in the full QCEW sample. Relative to this full sample, we apply three further
sample restrictions, illustrated by the successive lines in Figure 6.
First, our access to QCEW/LDE microdata is restricted to a subset of forty states that
approved access onsite at the BLS for this project. As a result, our sample excludes data
for Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Second, we restrict our sample to continuing establishments with positive employ-
ment in consecutive quarters. Specifically, we construct a set of overlapping quarter-
to-quarter balanced panels that exclude births and deaths of establishments within the
quarter. Note that we do not balance across quarters, so births in a given panel will ap-
pear as incumbents in the subsequent panel (if they survive). We focus on continuing
16The count of workers includes all those receiving any pay during the pay period, including part-time
workers and those on paid leave.
17Although the underlying microdata are available from 1990 on, the BLS does not publish data based
longitudinally-matched data for 1990–1991 due to changes in administrative procedures for how firms re-
ported their data over that period.
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Figure 6. Aggregate employment in the QCEW by sample restriction.
establishments because the canonical models of adjustment frictions analyzed above
are intended to describe adjustment patterns among incumbent firms.18
Our final sample restriction is to exclude establishments with more than 1000 em-
ployees in consecutive quarters. We do this for practical reasons. To measure the flow-
balance employment distribution in equations (4) and (13), and hence the diagnostic
suggested by the theory, we require measures of establishment flows between points in
the firm size distribution—specifically, inflows of mass to each employment level, and
the probability of outflow. To measure the latter with sufficient precision requires suffi-
cient sample sizes at all points in the distribution. Since establishments with more than
1000 employees comprise a very small fraction of US establishments (for example, less
than 01% in 2014Q2) sample sizes become impracticably thin beyond 1000 employees,
inducing substantial noise in implied estimates of our diagnostic.
Though the foregoing sample restrictions reduce the level of employment relative to
the US total, fluctuations in employment in our sample closely mimic the behavior of the
published aggregate. Figure 6 reveals that, in terms of levels, the largest loss of sample
size occurs because we are unable to access data for all states, accounting for around
30% of total employment in the United States. The further exclusion of noncontinuing
establishments and large establishments accounts, respectively, for around 2% and 10%
of employment. However, Figure 6 shows that the path of aggregate employment in our
sample resembles, in both trend and cycle, the path of aggregate employment in the
full QCEW sample. The correlation between log aggregate employment in the published
QCEW series for all states and that in our final microdata sample is 099.
18In constructing our sample of continuers, we also exclude the small subset of establishments that are
flagged as undergoing a potential change of ownership, since their employment adjustment may be sub-
ject to measurement error. Those establishments, which the BLS attempts to link with their predecessor or
successor, constitute only 01% of our total sample in 2014Q2.
Quantitative Economics 10 (2019) The aggregate effects of labor market frictions 825
Measurement To estimate our diagnostic, we require first an estimate of the distribu-
tion of employment under flow balance, hˆ(m). Substituting equations (4) and (13), re-
spectively, into the laws of motion (2) and (11), we can write the density under flow bal-
ance as
hˆt(m)= ht−1(m)+ ht(m)
φt(m)
 (20)
where t indexes quarters, ht−1(m) is the previous quarter’s mass of establishments with
employment m, ht(m) ≡ ht(m) − ht−1(m) is the quarterly change in that mass, and
φt(m) is the fraction of establishments that adjusts away from an employment level of
m in quarter t. Thus, estimation of hˆt(m) requires only an estimate of the outflow ad-
justment probability φt(m), in addition to measures of the evolution of the firm size
distribution ht(m).
The simplest approach to measuring φt(m) is to use our microdata to compute the
fraction of establishments with m workers in quarter t that reports employment differ-
ent from m in quarter t + 1. As alluded to above in motivating our sample restrictions,
however, a practical issue that arises is that sample sizes become small as m gets large,
inducing sampling variation in estimates of φt(m).
We further address this issue by discretizing the employment distribution at large
m. An advantage of the substantial sample sizes in the QCEW/LDE microdata is that we
can be relatively conservative in this regard. In particular, we allow individual bins for
each integer employment level up to 250 workers. In excess of 99% of establishments
lie in this range, and so sample sizes in each bin are large, between about 100 and 13
million establishments. For establishment sizes of 250 through 500 workers, we use bins
of length five, allowing us to maintain sample sizes of at least 80 establishments in each
quarter. Further up the distribution, of course, sample sizes get smaller, so we extend
our bin length to ten for employment levels between 500 and 999 workers. In this range,
sample sizes are at least 15 establishments in each quarter.
Denoting an individual bin by b, we estimate the firm size mass and the outflow
probability as
ht(b)=
∑
i
I[nit ∈ b] and φt(b)=
∑
i
I[nit /∈ b|nit−1 ∈ b]
∑
i
I[nit−1 ∈ b]
 (21)
where i indexes establishments. We use these measures to compute the flow-balance
mass in each bin according to equation (20) as hˆt(b)= ht−1(b)+ [ht(b)/φt(b)]. Finally,
we compute aggregate employment and its flow-balance counterpart by taking the inner
product of ht and hˆt with the midpoints of each bin, denoted mb,
Nt =
∑
b
mbht(b) and Nˆt =
∑
b
mbhˆt(b) (22)
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Figure 7. Actual and flow-balance log aggregate employment.
2.2 Inferring the aggregate effects of frictions
With this estimate of flow-balance aggregate employment Nˆt in hand, we can now con-
trast its dynamics with the predictions of the canonical models summarized in Section 1,
and in Figures 2 through 5.
A first look at the data Figure 7 plots the time series of Nt and Nˆt derived from appli-
cation of equation (22) to the QCEW/LDE microdata. Both series are expressed in log
deviations from a quadratic trend.19 Figure 7 reveals that Nˆt is a leading indicator of ac-
tual employment Nt , and is also more volatile. Specifically, the standard deviation of Nt
is 0025, whereas the standard deviation of Nˆt is 0031.
On the whole, however, the differences between the two series are modest. The me-
dian (mean) absolute difference between the series is just 05 (0.8) log points. Indeed,
there is remarkably little daylight between the two series between 1992 and 2008. Even
in the 2001 recession, flow-balance employment very closely tracks the drop in actual
employment. The only substantial difference between the series emerges in the Great
Recession. For instance, in the five quarters that bracket the trough of the recession,
2008Q4 to 2009Q4, the mean difference between the series is about 3 log points. How-
ever, this difference is short-lived. Since 2010, the two series have moved in tandem:
employment has increased 116 log points, whereas flow-balance employment has in-
creased 119 log points.
By contrast, recall from the theoretical results in Section 1 that canonical models
share the prediction that flow-balance employment jumps aggressively in response to
19Throughout our empirical analysis, we use quadratic time trends, rather than an HP filter, as the latter
is well known to suffer from end point problems, and the end of our sample is dominated by the recovery
from the most recent recession. The aggregate time series, as well as the impulse responses we show later,
are nonetheless qualitatively similar when a HP filter is applied to the data instead.
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aggregate shocks. Together these observations give a first suggestion that the propaga-
tion mechanism embodied in canonical models fails to capture the source of sluggish-
ness in empirical employment dynamics.
Time series matching To contrast the data with the models’ predictions more precisely,
we undertake a simulation exercise devised by King and Rebelo (1999) and Bachmann
(2012). They show that it is possible to find a sequence of aggregate shocks that gener-
ates a path for aggregate model-generated outcomes—in our case employment—that
matches an empirical analogue. In what follows, we use this technique to contrast the
time series of flow-balance employment in model and data when the path of aggregate
employment in each is constructed to be the same.
The procedure relies on the ability to summarize the dynamics of aggregate employ-
ment implied by the model using a simple aggregate law of motion. In a related adjust-
ment cost model, Bachmann shows that an AR(1) specification that relates log aggregate
employment to its own lag and current labor productivity does an excellent job of sum-
marizing these dynamics. We find that the same property holds for our model.
Figures 2 through 5 suggest that linear cost models are especially capable of gen-
erating persistence in actual aggregate employment. We therefore initiate an algorithm
with a variant of the (symmetric) linear cost model that is calibrated to replicate the
amplitude and persistence of the empirical dynamics of actual employment.20 We find
that a model with fixed wages and a linear cost that generates a quarterly inaction rate
of 86% achieves this goal. Note that this procedure is being generous to the model by
enabling it to match observed employment at the expense of violating the inaction rate
and the flexibility of real wages observed in the data. Further, recalling Proposition 2,
by suppressing movements in the real wage, we are dampening the volatility of flow-
balance employment implied by the model. Accordingly, we shall see that we obtain a
lower bound on the discrepancy between model and data.
In a first step, we use this model to generate 85 quarters of simulated data (the same
time span as in the data). We then estimate via OLS the following AR(1) process that
relates model-generated log aggregate employment to its lag and current aggregate pro-
ductivity pt ,
lnNt = νˆ0 + νˆ1 lnNt−1 + νˆ2 lnpt (23)
With estimates of equation (23) in hand, we check whether the law of motion
matches the empirical path of aggregate employment by substituting the latter time se-
ries into (23) and solving for the implied series of productivity. If the resultant sequence
{pt} is consistent with the assumed data-generating process, we stop. Otherwise, in a
20Specifically, we choose the flexibility of wages, the persistence of aggregate TFP, and the linear cost to
minimize the (sum of squares) distance between the empirical dynamics of observed employment N in
Figure 10A and those implied by an equivalent specification run on model-generated data. We do not pur-
sue the effects of asymmetries in adjustment costs here: the results of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that any
such asymmetries affect neither the dynamics of aggregate employment, nor its flow-balance counterpart.
We do not use the search model, since its implications mirror those of the model we simulate (see Figures 3
to 5), but come at the expense of greater computational burden (due to the additional fixed-point problem
over market tightness).
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Figure 8. Model-implied flow-balance log aggregate employment: time series.
second step, we reparameterize the productivity process and reinitialize the model with
this updated process. These steps are repeated until the moments of the productivity se-
ries implied by (23) are consistent with the parameterization assumed. In practice, the
AR(1) specification in (23) fits the data closely (the R-squared of the regression is 09985),
and so the algorithm converges quite quickly, after just a few iterations.21
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the results. To smooth out high frequency noise, we apply
the above algorithm to match a four-quarter moving average of log aggregate employ-
ment in the data. The standard deviation of the resulting time series for actual employ-
ment lnN , shown in Figure 8, is 0023. The model yields a notably more variable path for
aggregate flow-balance employment, Nˆ . The model-implied standard deviation of ln Nˆ
is 004, 40% larger than its empirical counterpart of 0028.
The deviations between model-implied and observed flow-balance employment are
thrown into even starker relief in and around recessions, as shown in Figure 9. When the
model-implied series is near its nadir, it lies 6–7 log points below its empirical counter-
part. Aggregate flow-balance employment also recovers significantly more quickly in the
wake of these downturns. In the eight quarters after the Great Recession, for instance,
the model’s flow-balance employment rises 16 log points. Its empirical counterpart in-
creases by half that amount over the same period.
Measuring persistence A final way of visualizing the difference between the data and
the models’ predictions is to contrast the response of flow-balance employment to es-
timated shifts in the aggregate driving force. Rather than attempting to use the data to
21The implied process for output per worker in the model generated data shares roughly the same statis-
tical properties as a similarly-smoothed output per worker series taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Productivity and Costs data. An estimated AR(1) through model-implied output per worker data gives a
persistence parameter of about 094 and a standard deviation of residuals of about 0004, comparable to
estimates from the data.
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Figure 9. Model-implied flow-balance log aggregate employment by episode. Notes: Each se-
ries is plotted relative to its own cyclical peak (panels A and B) or trough (C and D) since the
timing of the cycle can differ across series (although in practice they only differ by at most two
quarters).
identify structural shocks, which is prone to controversy, we instead undertake a de-
scriptive analysis of the dynamic properties of aggregate employment. A commonly
used gauge for the latter is a comparison of the dynamics of employment relative to
output-per-worker. In what follows, we interpret unforecastable movements in output-
per-worker as being indicative of innovations to the (latent) driving force, and estimate
the reaction of flow-balance employment, in model and data, to these forecast errors.
This serves as a simple way of summarizing the persistence of flow-balance employ-
ment.
830 Elsby, Michaels, and Ratner Quantitative Economics 10 (2019)
Formally, we proceed as follows. Denote log output-per-worker by yt . In a first stage,
we estimate innovations in yt that are unforecastable conditional on lags of y, and lags
of log aggregate employment lnN . Specifically, we use quarterly data on output-per-
worker in the nonfarm business sector from the BLS Productivity and Costs release and
our measure of actual employment from the QCEW to estimate the following AR(L) spec-
ification:
yt = αy +
L∑
s=1
β
y
s yt−s +
L∑
s=1
γ
y
s lnNt−s + δy1t + δy2t2 + εyt  (24)
Within the context of the models considered in Section 1, lags of output per worker
y can be interpreted as proxies for lags of aggregate technology p, conditional on lags of
N , as in (24). More broadly, they can be viewed as proxies for past realizations of busi-
ness cycle driving forces. Note that secular trends are captured using a quadratic time
trend.
The estimated residuals from this first-stage regression, εˆyt , are then used as the in-
novations to output-per-worker from which we derive impulse responses of actual and
flow-balance employment in a second stage,
lnNt = αN +
L−1∑
s=0
βNs εˆ
y
t−s +
L∑
s=1
γNs lnNt−s + δN1 t + δN2 t2 + εNt  and
ln Nˆt = αNˆ +
L−1∑
s=0
βNˆs εˆ
y
t−s +
L∑
s=1
γNˆs ln Nˆt−s + δNˆ1 t + δNˆ2 t2 + εNˆt 
(25)
Note that the timing in the lag structure of innovations to output-per-worker per-
mits a contemporaneous relationship between these innovations and employment, as
suggested by the model-based impulse responses described in Section 1.
The estimates from the regressions in equations (24) and (25) allow us to trace out
the dynamic relationship between each measure of log aggregate employment and a
one-log-point innovation in output-per-worker. In practice, we use a lag order of L = 4
in both stages, (24) and (25).22 Given the availability of our QCEW data, we estimate
these regressions over the period, 1992Q2 to 2014Q2.
Panel A of Figure 10 plots the results. The dynamic response of aggregate employ-
ment takes a familiar shape, rising slowly after the innovation with a peak response of
around 1 log point after five quarters. These hump-shaped dynamics mirror similar re-
sults found using different methods elsewhere in the literature (Blanchard and Diamond
(1989), Fujita and Ramey (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011)). This is one represen-
tation of the persistence of aggregate employment.
As suggested by the time series in Figure 7, the dynamics of the flow-balance diag-
nostic Nˆ share many of these properties. Although its peak response occurs earlier—
22Experiments with different lag orders suggest that, although the peak of the hump-shaped impulse
responses varies slightly across different lag lengths, Figure 10 is representative of results across these spec-
ifications.
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Figure 10. Descriptive impulse responses of employment and firm size flows.
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after three quarters—reinforcing the impression of Figure 7 that Nˆ is a leading indicator
of the path of N , it exhibits a similar volatility, and a clear hump-shape.
To contrast the empirical dynamics illustrated in Figure 10A with those implied by
canonical models of frictions, we rerun the regressions in equations (24) and (25) using
model-generated data. Following our preceding discussion, we use the model with sym-
metric linear costs, chosen to minimize the distance between the empirical dynamics of
actual employment N in Figure 10A and those implied by the model.
Panel B of Figure 10 reveals that this parameterization of the model is able to gener-
ate a dynamic relationship between actual employment and output-per-worker that is
comparable to the data. Although the model overstates the impact response, the ampli-
tude and persistence of employment are similar to their empirical counterparts.
A key result of Figure 10B, however, is that the model-implied dynamics of flow-
balance employment are profoundly different from those seen in the data. Confirming
the impression of the theoretical impulse responses in Figure 3, Nˆ jumps in response to
innovations in output-per-worker in the model, with an initial response five times larger
than that of actual employment N . In marked contrast, the empirical dynamics of Nˆ in
Figure 10A are much more sluggish, bearing a closer resemblance to the empirical path
of actual employment than its model-implied counterpart.
The substantial discrepancy between the implied and observed dynamics of flow-
balance employment is an important failure of canonical models of frictions, in the
sense that the models do not capture a key aspect of how shocks are propagated through
the labor market.
Robustness to measurement error The QCEW is drawn from administrative data and
considerable resources are devoted to ensuring its accuracy. Response rates are around
95%, significantly higher than in commonly-used establishment level data.23
Correspondence with BLS suggests that the most likely source of measurement er-
ror in the QCEW is from the roughly 5% of establishments whose reports are (at least
initially) missing, rather than incorrectly-reported data.24 Moreover, BLS procedures
for dealing with such nonresponse in principle could affect the behavior of our flow-
balance statistic: Employment for each missing establishment is imputed by multiply-
ing employment in the previous quarter by the establishment’s quarterly employment
growth for the same time in the prior year.
To investigate the potential implications of such measurement error, we conduct the
following exercise: We take the model underlying Figure 10 and randomly assign missing
data to 5% of firms in the simulated data. For those firms, we impute employment in
the simulated data in the same fashion as the BLS; that is, employment in the missing
quarter is assumed to equal previous employment multiplied by the growth rate over the
same quarter 1 year before.
Viewed from the perspective of the models we study, such measurement error will
affect our flow-balance statistic because measured establishment flows among the im-
puted subsample will not respond to any intervening shocks. Thus, one might expect
23Response rates for the QCEW are reported in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017). By contrast, the Current
Employment Statistics survey, for example, has a response rate of just above 50% (Groen (2012)).
24Thanks to Jess Helfand at the BLS for her help with this.
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the flow-balance statistic to respond less aggressively if some of the firm-size flows are
imputed from year-old growth rates.
Quantitatively, however, this affects our main results only modestly. In Figure 11A we
recalculate the model impulse responses in Figure 10B using model-generated data with
measurement error. Because the microdata in the QCEW are rarely missing, the impulse
response of actual employment is nearly unaffected. As anticipated, flow-balance em-
ployment does respond somewhat less to the impulse, but the differences between the
impulse response functions with and without measurement error are very small.
2.3 Understanding the failure of canonical models
To examine the origins of this failure of canonical models, recall that the link between
our diagnostic flow-balance employment Nˆ and frictionless employment N∗ is medi-
ated through the behavior of firm size flows—the τs and φs of equations (4) and (13)—
and that canonical frictions have strong predictions regarding the dynamics of these
flows by establishment size.
As we have emphasized, a key benefit of the data is that we can measure aspects of
these flows using the longitudinal dimension of the QCEW microdata—specifically the
total inflow to, and the probability of outflow from, each employment level. Our next
exercise, therefore, is to contrast the dynamics of the firm size distribution in the data to
those implied by canonical models of frictions.
To do this, we first split establishments in the data into three size classes. We choose
these to correspond to the lower quartile (fewer than 15 employees), interquartile range
(16 to 170 employees), and upper quartile (171 employees and greater) of establishment
sizes. We then estimate descriptive impulse responses that mirror equations (24) and
(25) for the total inflow to, and probability of outflow from, each size class.25 As in our
previous analysis of the dynamics of aggregate employment, we repeat these same steps
using data simulated from the model underlying Figure 10B that is calibrated to match
as closely as possible the empirical dynamics of aggregate employment.
Panels C through F of Figure 10 illustrate the results of this exercise. The empirical
and model-implied dynamics share a qualitative property, namely that positive aggre-
gate shocks render small (large) establishments more (less) likely to adjust away from
their current employment, and induce fewer (more) establishments to adjust to low
(high) employment levels.
Aside from this broad qualitative similarity, the quantitative dynamics reveal striking
contrasts. The empirical behavior of firm size flows exhibits an inertia not only in the
sense that their levels are retarded relative to a frictionless environment, but also in the
sluggishness of their responses to aggregate disturbances.
We highlight three manifestations of this general observation. First, note that the
empirical responses of the firm size flows in Figures 10C and 10E are an order of mag-
nitude smaller than their theoretical counterparts in Figures 10D and 10F. Second, the
dynamics of the flows in the data are much more sluggish than implied by canonical
25To aggregate within a quartile range, we take a weighted average across establishment sizes, where the
weight is the size’s share of all establishments in the range.
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frictions. Firm size dynamics in the model respond aggressively on impact of the aggre-
gate shock. In the data, the response is mild and delayed. Third, the empirical dynamics
reveal an establishment size gradient in the magnitude of the response of firm size flows:
Flows to and from smaller establishments respond less than their counterparts for larger
establishments.
The upshot of this exercise is that canonical models of labor market frictions do a
poor job of capturing the empirical dynamics of the firm size distribution. Since the
latter is the key channel through which canonical frictions are supposed to impede ag-
gregate employment dynamics, this is an important limitation of this class of model.
3. Summary and discussion
In this paper, we have explored the propagation mechanism embodied in a canonical
class of labor market frictions. In postulating several forms of nonconvex adjustment
frictions, this class has the virtue of being able to reproduce the conspicuous degree of
inaction observed in establishment employment dynamics. We further show that (some
of) these labor market frictions are in turn able to generate at least part of the observed
sluggishness in aggregate employment dynamics.
However, canonical frictions have strong implications for the source of this propa-
gation, for which we do not find empirical support. In this class of models, deviations of
aggregate employment from its frictionless path arise because frictions retard the flow
of labor across firms. But since the latter induces pent-up demand for adjustment, these
firm size flows are predicted to respond rapidly to aggregate shocks. We use this to mo-
tivate a summary statistic for these flows, which we have labeled flow-balance employ-
ment that can be measured with access to establishment panel data.
We find that empirical measures of flow-balance employment display only mild de-
partures from the path of actual employment, exhibit much more sluggish dynamics
than implied by canonical frictions, and that the source of this tension can be traced to
a failure of canonical models to capture the empirical persistence of firm size flows.
In the light of these findings, it is natural to ask which alternative sources of frictions
might be able to reconcile this tension. We highlight two possible reconciliations.
Convex costs The first returns to an older literature on convex adjustment costs (as in,
e.g., Sargent (1978) and Shapiro (1986)). A distinctive feature of these frictions is that
they induce sluggishness in the response of firms’ employment to shocks conditional
on adjustment. This additional persistence in the labor demand policy rules of firms
naturally will spill over into additional persistence in implied firm size flows. Put another
way, in the same way that the overshooting property of firm size flows is mitigated as the
adjustment cost structure moves from fixed to linear costs, it is mitigated still further by
the presence of convex costs. We now present a quantitative exploration of convex costs.
Specifically, we return to the model underlying the quantitative exercise illustrated in
Figure 10, and alter the parameterization of the adjustment cost from linear to quadratic
as follows:
Π(n−1x)≡max
n
{
pxnα −wn− k
2
(n)2 +βE[Π(nx′)|x]
}
 (26)
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Figure 11. Descriptive impulse responses: model extensions.
The quadratic cost implies that the marginal cost of adjustment rises with the rate of
adjustment. We conduct an exercise analogous to that implemented in Figure 10, now
choosing the coefficient on the convex cost to minimize the distance between the model
and empirical impulse response of actual employment.
The results of this exercise are depicted in Figure 11B, which presents the impulse
responses of both aggregate employment and its flow balance counterpart in the con-
vex costs model. The results are encouraging. As in Figure 10B, and as per the calibra-
tion, the model impulse response of actual employment evolves similarly to its empirical
counterpart. In contrast to Figure 10B, however, the model’s impulse response for flow-
balance employment now captures some of the sluggishness of its empirical analogue:
flow-balance employment in the convex cost model now takes two quarters to reach its
peak, and the amplitude of its response is far closer to that in the data (although the
response is still noticeably larger on impact than in the data).
The upshot of this exercise is that convex adjustment costs provide one way to rec-
oncile the sluggishness not only of actual employment, but also of the underlying firm
size flows. While the former is well understood, the latter is new, and indeed provides a
microeconomic justification for the presence of convex adjustment costs.
However, there remain reasons to be wary of reembracing a role for convex adjust-
ment costs. First, the presence of inaction is perhaps the most prominent stylized fact of
microeconomic employment adjustment, and is indeed the empirical impetus behind
the class of canonical models in Section 1 that seek to trace out a link from microe-
conomic inertia to macroeconomic persistence. By making the marginal cost of small
adjustments also small, convex costs do not shape aggregate employment dynamics
through microeconomic inaction.
Second, prior work has noted other microeconomic moments that are inconsistent
with the prominence of convex costs. Most notably, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis
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(2015) observe a negative comovement of hours and employment at the establishment
level. As they note, this militates against a significant role for convex costs, under which
firms expand employment slowly, and “fill the gap” in labor input with an increase in
hours, so that the two are positively related. In contrast, fixed costs of adjusting induce
firms to raise employment discretely, allowing them to save on overtime hours, and gen-
erating the observed negative correlation in the data. As a result, the estimate of k in
Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis is far lower than what is needed in our exercise to re-
produce the dynamics of aggregate employment. Whereas we infer a value of k= 0136,
their estimates imply values at least three orders of magnitude smaller.26
Finally, it has been argued that there is little a priori reason for convex costs, a point
made forcefully by Rothschild (1971). Consider the case of training. A key component of
training costs is the resources spent on deciding how to train; the latter is better mod-
eled as a fixed cost of adjusting. Carrying out the training also does not necessarily run
into increasing marginal cost. As Rothschild observed, “it requires at least one teacher
to train one worker [and] presumably no more teachers are required to train two or
three.”27
The broader message of our results, then, is that frictions that dampen changes in
labor demand among adjusters can indeed generate sluggish firm-size flows. While a
quadratic cost of adjusting is one particularly straightforward way of illustrating this
point, further implications of such convex costs are less compelling. A natural question,
then, is whether it is possible to devise an account of employment dynamics that builds
on the canonical frictions in Section 1 to provide a bridge between prominent moments
of the microdata and their macroeconomic implications; that is, from inaction and per-
sistence in firm size flows to sluggishness in aggregate employment. In what follows, we
present one such possibility.
Interactionswith information frictions We explore a setting in which inaction—and the
canonical labor market frictions that underlie it—might interact with other frictions to
induce the observed sluggishness in firm-size flows.
In particular, consider an extension of the models in Section 1 that allows for an
interaction of labor market and information frictions. Intuitively, if firms do not have
full information on aggregate disturbances, they may attenuate their hiring and firing,
dampening the response of flows of labor across firms.
To illustrate, suppose aggregate productivity is the sum of transitory and permanent
components. Firms observe aggregate productivity but not its constituent parts.28 For
26Since Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis express the quadratic cost in percentage-change terms, we di-
vide their estimate of the coefficient on the quadratic cost in their Table 4a by the average firm size in their
simulated panel. This implies values of k that range from 5 × 10−4 (if only a quadratic cost is included in
their model) to 3× 10−8 (if both fixed and quadratic costs are included).
27In addition, analyses of French survey data which ask firms directly about the cost of hires and sepa-
rations reject a convex structure of adjustment costs (Abowd and Kramarz (2003), Kramarz and Michaud
(2009)). Clearly, the structure of adjustment frictions in France will not necessarily mirror those in other
economies such as the US, for example, due to differences in labor market institutions.
28For early applications of this information structure in macroeconomics, see Brunner, Cukierman, and
Meltzer (1980), Kydland and Prescott (1982), and Gertler (1982). More recently, see Erceg and Levin (2003).
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the sake of concreteness, assume also that there is a symmetric linear cost of employ-
ment adjustment. In the absence of the labor market frictions, firms’ labor demand is
the outcome of a simple static optimization problem, for which only knowledge of ag-
gregate productivity is required. Thus, absent labor adjustment frictions, the informa-
tion friction has no bite.
In the presence of employment adjustment frictions, however, firms must forecast
the path of the aggregate state, which requires a judgment of the degree to which an ag-
gregate disturbance is permanent. Hiring and firing decisions are thus based on percep-
tions of the persistent component of productivity. Standard signal extraction arguments
will imply that such perceptions are a slow-moving state variable (see, e.g., Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015)). Accordingly, hiring and firing decisions respond less ag-
gressively to aggregate shocks on impact. This can lead, qualitatively, to the drawn-out
dynamics of the labor market flows we observe in the data. Critically, this persistence
in hiring and firing policies will in turn contribute to persistent aggregate employment
dynamics.
The quantitative success of such a model will hinge on the rate at which firms up-
date their assessment of the persistent component of aggregate productivity, and the
extent to which such persistence can be reconciled with the large cyclical volatility of
employment. Nonetheless, we suspect that an interaction of labor market frictions with
a notion of imperfect information provides a promising avenue of further research that
seeks to understand aggregate employment persistence.29
Appendix A: Laws of motion for the firm size distribution
To derive the laws of motion in equations (2) and (11) in the main text, we require no-
tation for several distributions. As in the main text, we denote the densities of employ-
ment, lagged employment, and frictionless employment by h, h−1, and h∗, and will refer
to their respective distribution functions by analogous uppercase letters, H, H−1, and
H∗. In addition, however, we require notation for the distributions of frictionless em-
ployment conditional on lagged employment, which we denote by H∗(ξ|ν) = Pr(n∗ <
ξ|n−1 = ν), and the distribution of lagged employment conditional on frictionless em-
ployment, denoted by H(ν|ξ) = Pr(n−1 < ν|n∗ = ξ). The latter are related by Bayes’ rule,
h(ν|ξ)h∗(ξ) = h∗(ξ|ν)h−1(ν), where lowercase script letters denote associated density
functions. But we preserve separate notation to aid clarity.
We can now use the labor demand policy rules—(1) for the fixed costs case, (10) for
the linear costs case—to construct laws of motion for the distribution function of actual
employment H(n) implied by each type of friction. We then show how these imply the
laws of motion for the density h(n) stated in equations (2) and (11) in the main text.
Fixed costs Consider a point m in the domain of the employment distribution. We wish
to derive the flows in and out of H(m). To do so, we first derive flows for a given lagged
employment level n−1. Then inflows into H(m) are summarized as follows:
29Interestingly, though information frictions in macro have been revived in recent literature in monetary
economics (see Mankiw and Reis, 2011 survey), they have been used much more sparingly in understand-
ing of labor dynamics. (For an exception, see Venkateswaran (2013).)
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(1) If m < L(n−1), or equivalently n−1 > L−1(m), then the inflow is equal to
H∗(m|n−1).
(2) If m ∈ [L(n−1)n−1), or equivalently n−1 ∈ (mL−1(m)], then the inflow is equal
to H∗(L(n−1)|n−1).
Likewise, the outflows from H(m) for a given n−1 can be evaluated as:
(3) If m ∈ (n−1U(n−1)], or equivalently n−1 ∈ [U−1(m)m), then the outflow is equal
to 1−H∗(U(n−1)|n−1).
(4) If m > U(n−1), or equivalently n−1 < U−1(m), then the outflow is equal to 1 −
H∗(m|n−1).
Integrating the latter with respect to the distribution of lagged employmentH−1(n−1)
recovers the aggregate flows and thereby the law of motion for H(m),
H(m)=
∫
L−1(m)
H∗(m|n−1)dH−1(n−1)+
∫ L−1(m)
m
H∗(L(n−1)|n−1)dH−1(n−1)
−
∫ m
U−1(m)
[
1−H∗(U(n−1)|n−1)]dH−1(n−1)
−
∫ U−1(m)[
1−H∗(m|n−1)
]
dH−1(n−1) (27)
Linear costs Likewise, one can use the adjustment rule for the linear costs case, (10), to
construct an analogous law of motion under linear costs. Again, we first fix a given level
of lagged employment, n−1, and evaluate inflows to, and outflows from, H(m). These
flows are simpler in the linear costs case. Inflows are given by:
(1) If m< n−1, or equivalently n−1 >m, then the inflow is equal to H∗(l(m)|n−1).
Similarly, outflows are given by:
(2) If m> n−1, or equivalently n−1 <m, then the outflow is equal to 1−H∗(u(m)|n−1).
Following the same logic as above, the law of motion for H(m) is thus given by
H(m)=
∫
m
H∗(l(m)|n−1)dH−1(n−1)
−
∫ m[
1−H∗(u(m)|n−1)]dH−1(n−1) (28)
Laws of motion for h(n) Differentiating (27) and (28) with respect to m, cancelling
terms, and using Bayes’ rule to note that
∫ ν
0 h
∗(ξ|n−1)h−1(n−1)dn−1 =
∫ ν
0 h(n−1|ξ) ×
h∗(ξ)dn−1 yields the simpler laws of motion for the density of employment h(n), equa-
tions (2) and (11) in the main text.
Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
To establish Propositions 1 and 2 in the main text, it is convenient first to define a notion
of quasi-frictionless employment, defined as the employment level implied by friction-
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less labor demand, evaluated at the frictional wage, w. Lemma 1 shows that the firm’s
problem can be normalized with respect to quasi-frictionless employment to establish
some useful homogeneity properties. Using this homogeneous problem, we can relate
the change in aggregate log flow balance employment Nˆ to the change in aggregate log
quasi-frictionless employment. In a final step, we link the latter to the change in aggre-
gate log frictionless employment.
Definition. (i) Quasi-frictionless employment n solves pxαnα−1 ≡w, where w is the
frictional equilibrium wage; and (ii) frictionless employment n∗ solves pxαn∗α−1 ≡ w∗,
where w∗ is the frictionless equilibrium wage.
Remark. The change in aggregate log quasi-frictionless employment N  induced by a
change in aggregate productivity  lnp is related to the change in aggregate log friction-
less employment N ∗ according to
N  = 1− w
1− w∗ N
∗ (29)
where w and w∗ denote the elasticities of the equilibrium wage to aggregate productiv-
ity p, respectively with and without frictions.
Lemma 1 (Caballero and Engel (1999)). Consider the firm’s problem,
Π(n−1x)≡ max
n
{
pxnα −wn−C+I[n > n−1] −C−I[n < n−1] − c+n+
+ c−n− +βE[Π(nx′)|x]} (30)
If (i) lnx′ = lnx+ ε′x with ε′x i.i.d., and (ii) C−/+ = −/+wn and c−/+ = γ−/+w, then (a)
the adjustment policy takes the form
n=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
n/u if n > U · n−1
n−1 if n ∈ [L · n−1U · n−1]
n/l if n < L · n−1
(31)
for constantsL≤ l < 1< u≤U ; and (b)desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(n/n−1),
are independent of initial firm size n−1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since idiosyncratic shocks follow a geometric random walk, lnx′ =
lnx+ε′x, so does (quasi-) frictionless employment, lnn′ = lnn+ε′n where ε′n = ε′x/(1−
α). Defining z = n/n and ζ = n−1/n, a conjecture that Π(n−1x)=wnΠ˜(ζ) implies
Π˜(ζ)= max
z
{
zα
α
− z − +I[z > ζ] − −I[z < ζ] − γ+(z − ζ)+ + γ−(z − ζ)−
+βE[eε′n Π˜(e−ε′n z)]
}
 (32)
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We highlight two aspects of (32). First, the expectation over the forward value is no
longer conditional, since it is taken over ε′n , which is i.i.d. Second, the firm’s problem
is simplified to the choice of a number z = n/n for each realization of the single state
variable ζ = n−1/n, consistent with the conjectured form of the value function.
An Ss policy will thus stipulate that z = ζ for intermediate values of ζ ∈ [1/U1/L],
and will set z = 1/u whenever ζ < 1/U , and z = 1/l whenever ζ > 1/L. Mapping back
into employment terms implies the adjustment policy in (31), establishing part (a) of
the result. Note that the case of pure fixed costs implies u = l, while pure linear costs
imply l =L<U = u.
To establish part (b), note that the probability of a desired log employment adjust-
ment of size less than δ can be written, in general, as
Pr
(
ln
(
n
′
/n
)
< δ|n)= Pr(ε′n < δ+ lnz|n)
=
∫
Pr
(
ε′n < δ+ lnz|nz
)
dZ(z|n) (33)
where Z(z|n) denotes the distribution function of z given n. In the context of the canon-
ical model, however, (33) simplifies. First, ε′n is independent of n since the former is
i.i.d. Second, z is also independent of n. To see this, note first that if a firm adjusts
this period, its choice of z is uninformed by n—it sets z = 1/u or z = 1/l. If the firm
sets n = n−1 but adjusted last period, then it sets lnz = lnn−1 − lnn = lnz−1 − εn and
z−1 is 1/u or 1/l. Thus, z is again independent of n. More generally, suppose the firm
last adjusted T periods ago, that is, n = n−1 = · · · = n−T and z−T = 1/u or 1/l. Then
lnz = lnn−T − lnn = lnz−T − ∑T−1t=0 εn−t . Each term here is independent of n = n−T .
Equation (33) therefore collapses to
Pr
(
ln
(
n
′
/n
)
< δ|n)=
∫
Pr
(
ε′n < δ+ lnz|z
)
dZ(z) (34)
which does not depend on n.
Proof of Proposition 1. Denoting log employment by n, the adjustment rules take
the form L(n)= n− λ and U(n)= n+υ for λ > 0 and υ> 0. The density of log employ-
ment in flow balance is then defined by
hˆ(n)≡ 1−H(n + λ|n)+H(n − υ|n)
1−H(n + υ|n)+H(n − λ|n)h
(n) (35)
where H(ξ|ν) ≡ Pr(n < ξ|n−1 = ν) and H(ν|ξ) ≡ Pr(n−1 < ν|n = ξ). The property of
the canonical model noted in result (b) of Lemma 1, that n − n−1 is independent of
n−1, implies that
H(ξ|ν)= Pr(n − n−1 < ξ− ν)≡ H˜(ξ− ν) (36)
This implies that the probability of adjusting away from n is independent of n,
1−H(n + υ|n)+H(n − λ|n)= 1−
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)dz ≡φ (37)
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Now consider the probability of adjusting to n. Using Bayes’ rule, equation (36), and
a change of variable, we can write this as
1−H(n + λ|n)+H(n − υ|n)
= 1−
∫ n+λ
n−υ
h(n|ν)h−1(ν)
h(n)
dν
= 1−
∫ n+λ
n−υ
h˜(n − ν)h−1(ν)
h(n)
dν
= 1−
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)
h−1(n − z)
h(n)
dz (38)
Piecing this together, we have
hˆ(n)=
h(n)−
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)h−1(n − z)dz
1−
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)dz
 (39)
Multiplying both sides by n, using (37), and integrating yields
Nˆ ≡
∫ ∞
−∞
nhˆ(n)dn = N

φ
− 1
φ
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)
∫ ∞
−∞
nh−1(n − z)dndz
= N

φ
− 1−φ
φ
N−1 − 1
φ
∫ υ
−λ
zh˜(z)dz (40)
Since there is a constant-N  state prior to the aggregate shock, aggregate log employ-
ment is constant and equal to aggregate flow-balance employment, N−1 = N−2 = Nˆ−1.
Imposing this and solving for Nˆ−1 yields
Nˆ−1 =N −1 −
∫ υ
−λ
zh˜−1(z)dz (41)
Now consider a shock to aggregate log (quasi-) frictionless employment, N . On
impact this will shift the distribution of desired employment adjustments, h˜(·), by N .
Given the prior constant-N  state, substitution of (41) into (40) implies
Nˆ = N

φ
− 1
φ
∫ υ
−λ
zh˜(z)dz (42)
Noting that h˜(z) = h˜−1(z − N ) − h˜−1(z), taking a first-order approximation
around N  = 0, h˜(z) ≈ −h˜′−1(z)N , inserting into (42), and integrating by parts
yield
Nˆ ≈ (1+ψ) ·N  where ψ≡ υh˜

−1(υ)+ λh˜−1(−λ)
φ−1
 (43)
The latter, combined with equation (29), implies the stated result.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The proof mirrors the proof of Proposition 1 above. The ad-
justment rules again take the form l(n) = n − λ and u(n) = n + υ for λ > 0 and υ > 0.
The density of log employment in flow balance is then defined by
hˆ(n)≡
[
1−H(n|n − λ)]h(n − λ)+H(n|n + υ)h(n + υ)
1−H(n + υ|n)+H(n − λ|n)  (44)
Since H(ξ|ν)= Pr(n − n−1 < ξ− ν)≡ H˜(ξ − ν), the probability of adjusting away
from n is again independent of n,
1−H(n + υ|n)+H(n − λ|n)= 1−
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)dz ≡φ (45)
Now use Bayes’ rule to write the probabilities of adjusting down and up to n as
1−H(n|n − λ)=
∫ ∞
n
h(n − λ|ν) h−1(ν)
h(n − λ) dν
=
∫ ∞
n
h˜(n − λ− ν) h−1(ν)
h(n − λ) dν
=
∫ −λ
−∞
h˜(z)
h−1(n − λ− z)
h(n − λ) dz (46)
and, using an analogous method,
H(n|n + υ)=
∫ ∞
υ
h˜(z)
h−1(n + υ− z)
h(n + υ) dz (47)
Piecing this together, we have
hˆ(n)=
∫ −λ
−∞
h˜(z)h−1(n − λ− z)dz +
∫ ∞
υ
h˜(z)h−1(n + υ− z)dz
1−
∫ υ
−λ
h˜(z)dz
 (48)
Multiplying both sides by n and integrating yield
Nˆ = 1
φ
∫ −λ
−∞
h˜(z)
∫ ∞
−∞
nh−1(n − λ− z)dndz
+ 1
φ
∫ ∞
υ
h˜(z)
∫ ∞
−∞
nh−1(n + υ− z)dndz
= N
∗
φ
− 1−φ
φ
N−1 + 1
φ
[
λ
∫ −λ
−∞
h˜(z)dz − υ
∫ ∞
υ
h˜(z)dz
]
− 1
φ
∫ υ
−λ
zh˜(z)dz (49)
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where we have used the fact that
∫∞
−∞ zh˜
(z)dz = N  − N−1. Solving for Nˆ−1 = N−1 =
N−2 in the prior constant-N  state yields
Nˆ−1 =N −1 + λ
∫ −λ
−∞
h˜−1(z)dz − υ
∫ ∞
υ
h˜−1(z)dz −
∫ υ
−λ
zh˜−1(z)dz (50)
Substitution of (50) into (49) implies that a shock to aggregate log (quasi-) friction-
less employment that shifts h˜(·) by N  will induce a change in Nˆ relative to the prior
constant-N  state equal to
Nˆ = N

φ
+ 1
φ
[
λ
∫ −λ
−∞
h˜(z)dz − υ
∫ ∞
υ
h˜(z)dz
]
− 1
φ
∫ υ
−λ
zh˜(z)dz (51)
Noting that h˜(z) = h˜−1(z − N ) − h˜−1(z), a first-order approximation around
N  = 0 yields
Nˆ ≈ N  (52)
Combining with equation (29), yields the stated result.
Appendix C: Large-firm canonical search and matching model
In this Appendix, we describe in more detail the theoretical results and the quantitative
numerical model presented in Section 1.5.
Theoretical results The firm’s problem for this model combines equations (16) and (17)
in the main text to obtain
Π(n−1x)≡max
n
{
Apxnα − (1−η)ωn− c
q(θ)
n+ +βE[Π(nx′)|x]
}

whereA≡ 1−η
1−η(1− α) (53)
To establish Proposition 3 in the main text, we proceed as above.
Definition. (i). Quasi-frictionless employment n solvesApxαnα−1 ≡ (1−η)ω, where
ω is the worker’s outside option; and (ii) frictionless employment n∗ solves pxαn∗α−1 ≡
w∗, where w∗ is the frictionless equilibrium wage.
Remark. The change in aggregate log quasi-frictionless employment N  induced by a
change in aggregate productivity  lnp is related to the change in aggregate log friction-
less employment N ∗ according to
N  = 1− ω
1− w∗ N
∗ (54)
where ω and w∗ respectively denote the elasticities of the worker’s outside option ω
and the frictionless wage w∗ to aggregate productivity p.
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Lemma 1′ . If (i) lnx′ = lnx+ ε′x with ε′x i.i.d., and (ii) c = γ(1−η)ω, then (a) the adjust-
ment triggers take the form in (10), are linear, l(n)= l · n and u(n)= u · n for time-varying
l < 1< u; and (b) desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(n/n−1), are independent of
initial firm size n−1.
Proof. Note that a conjecture that Π(n−1x)= (1−η)ωnΠ˜(ζ) yields
Π˜(ζ)≡max
z
{
zα
α
− z − γ
q(θ)
(z − ζ)+ +βE[eε′n Π˜(e−ε′n z)]
}
 (55)
Results (a) and (b) follow from the proof to Lemma 1 above.
Lemma 2. If (i) the adjustment triggers are symmetric, − ln l = lnu ≡ μ, and (ii) the dis-
tribution of innovations εn is symmetric, E(−εn) = 1 − E(εn), then the distribution of
desired (log) employment adjustments ln(n/n−1) is symmetric, H˜(−ς)= 1− H˜(ς).
Proof. Note first that the distribution of the desired log change in employment, n −
n−1, conditional on last period’s log gap, z−1 = n−1 −n−1, takes the simple form Pr(n −
n−1 < ς|z−1)= E(ς+ z−1), since εn ≡ n −n−1 is i.i.d. with distribution function E(·). It
follows that the unconditional distribution of n − n−1 is
H˜(ς)=
∫ μ
−μ
Pr
(
n − n−1 < ς|z−1
)
g(z−1)dz−1 =
∫ μ
−μ
E(ς + z−1)g(z−1)dz−1 (56)
where g(z−1) is the ergodic density of z−1. It is simple to verify that E(−εn)= 1− E(εn)
implies H˜(ς)= 1− H˜(−ς), provided g(·) also is symmetric, which we now establish.
Our strategy is to conjecture that g(·) is symmetric and verify that this is implied.
Consider a firm with an initial z−1 = z − ε such that z ∈ (−μμ) lies strictly inside the
inaction range. Clearly, this firm migrates to z if it draws ε.Thus, the mass of firms at z
this period is given by
g(z)=
∫ z+μ
z−μ
g(z − ε)dE(ε)=
∫ μ
−μ
g(y)dE(z − y) (57)
where we have used the change of variable y = z − ε. Under the conjecture that g(y) =
g(−y), one can confirm g(z) = g(−z). To see this, evaluate g(·) at −z, use symmetry of
E(·), a change of variable y˜ = −y, and standard rules of calculus to obtain
g(−z)=
∫ μ
−μ
g(y)dE(−z−y)=
∫ μ
−μ
g(y)dE(z + y)
= −
∫ −μ
μ
g(−y˜) dE(z − y˜)=
∫ μ
−μ
g(−y)dE(z − y) (58)
Now consider the mass at the lower adjustment barrier, z = −μ. This is comprised of
two parts: first, firms that begin at −μ, draw a negative labor demand shock (ε < 0), and
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adjust to remain at −μ; and second, firms that began away from −μ and then migrate
there. Thus,
g(−μ)= E(0)g(−μ)+
∫ 2μ
0
g(−μ+ ε)dE(−ε)
= 1E(0)
∫ 2μ
0
g(−μ+ ε)dE(ε) (59)
where the second equality follows from symmetry of E(·). A similar argument can be
used to show that the mass at the upper adjustment barrier z = μ satisfies
g(μ)= 1E(0)
∫ 2μ
0
g(μ− ε)dE(ε) (60)
A conjecture of symmetry g(−μ+ ε) = g(μ − ε) is again confirmed, g(−μ) = g(μ).
It follows that g(z)= g(−z) for all z ∈ [−μμ], and symmetry of H˜(·) obtains.
Proof of Proposition 3. The first-order conditions that define the triggers for opti-
mal adjustment z ∈ {1/u1/l} are given by
l1−α +βD(1/l;θ)≡ 1
u1−α +βD(1/u;θ)≡ 1+ γ
q(θ)

(61)
where D(z;θ)≡ E[Π˜′(e−ε′n z)]. The latter satisfies the following recursion:
D(z;θ)=
∫ ln(uz)
ln(lz)
[
e(1−α)ε
′
n zα−1 − 1+βD(e−ε′n z;θ)]dE(ε′n)
+ γ
q(θ)
[
1− E(ln(uz))] (62)
We first consider a first-order approximation to the firm’s optimal policies around
γ = 0.30 To this end, note first that, by Leibniz’s rule
Dγ(z;θ)≈ 1
q(θ)
[
1− E(ln(uz))]+β
∫ ln(uz)
ln(lz)
Dγ
(
e−ε
′
n z;θ)dE(ε′n)
= 1
q(θ)
[
1− E(lnz)] when γ = 0 (63)
30Equation (62) has the form D(z) = C(Dγ)(z), where C is a contraction map on the cross product of
the space of bounded and continuous functions (where D “lives”) and [0], a closed subinterval of the
nonnegative real line from which γ is drawn. By inspection, this map is continuously differentiable with
respect to (w.r.t.) γ ∈ [0]. It then follows from Lemma 1 of Albrecht, Holmlund, and Lang (1991) that D
is continuously differentiable w.r.t. γ and satisfies the recursion, Dγ(z) = Cγ(Dγ)(z) + CD(DγDγ)(z),
where CD is the Frechet derivative of C. The right side of the latter expression defines a(nother) contraction
map on a space of bounded and continuous functions. We have then that Dγ is bounded and continuous
on [0]. Its calculation in (63) follows.
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Thus we can write D(z;θ)≈ γ[1−E(lnz)]/q(θ). Substituting into the first-order con-
ditions and noting that l = e−λ and u= eυ yield
e−(1−α)λ +β γ
q(θ)
[
1− E(λ)]≈ 1
e(1−α)υ +β γ
q(θ)
[
1− E(−υ)]≈ 1+ γ
q(θ)

(64)
Next, linearizing the leading terms around λ = 0 and υ = 0 (consistent with γ = 0),
respectively, leads to
−(1− α)λ+β γ
q(θ)
[
1− E(λ)]≈ 0
(1− α)υ+β γ
q(θ)
[
1− E(−υ)]≈ γ
q(θ)

(65)
Imposing β≈ 1, and E(−ε)= 1− E(ε) yields λ≈ υ.
Now return to the relationship between Nˆ and N  in equation (51). Time-
variation in the adjustment triggers alters the approximations around small aggregate
shocks. Specifically, with λ≈ υ≈ μ, equation (51) becomes
Nˆ ≈ N

φ
+ 1
φ
[

(
μ
∫ −μ
−∞
h˜(z)dz
)
−
(
μ
∫ ∞
μ
h˜(z)dz
)]
− 1
φ

(∫ μ
−μ
zh˜(z)dz
)
 (66)
In order to take a first-order approximation around N  = 0, note that
∂
(
μ
∫ −μ
−∞
h˜(z)dz
)
∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
= −μ−1h˜−1(−μ−1)
+ {H˜−1(−μ−1)−μ−1h˜−1(−μ−1)} ∂μ∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
; (67)
similarly,
∂
(
μ
∫ ∞
μ
h˜(z)dz
)
∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
= μ−1h˜−1(μ−1)
+ {1− H˜−1(μ−1)−μ−1h˜−1(μ−1)} ∂μ∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
; (68)
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and,
∂
(∫ μ
−μ
zh˜(z)dz
)
∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
= 1−φ−1 −μ−1
[
h˜−1(μ−1)+ h˜−1(−μ−1)
]
+μ−1
[
h˜−1(μ−1)− h˜−1(−μ−1)
] ∂μ
∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
 (69)
Using these and (66) it follows that, to a first-order approximation around N  = 0,
Nˆ ≈ N  + 1
φ−1
{H˜−1(−μ−1)− [1− H˜−1(μ−1)]} ∂μ∂N 
∣∣∣∣
N =0
·N  (70)
To complete the proof, note from Lemma 2 that symmetry of the adjustment barri-
ers, and of E(·), implies that H˜−1(·) is also symmetric. It follows that H˜−1(−μ−1)− [1−
H˜−1(μ−1)] ≈ 0, and (70) collapses to Nˆ ≈ N . The result then follows from equation
(54).
Numerical model Our numerical results are derived from a model that augments the
firm’s problem (16) with a time-invariant per-worker hiring cost k as follows:
Π(n−1x)≡ max
n
{
Apxnα − (1−η)ωn−
(
c
q(θ)
+ k
)
n+ +βE[Π(nx′)|x]
}

where A≡ 1−η
1−η(1− α) (71)
and the workers’ threat point ω is given by (19). The model is solved at a bi-weekly fre-
quency as a means to approximate the continuous time nature of labor market flows.
We now describe how we set values of the structural parameters not described in
Section 1.5. Three of the remaining parameters are the size of the labor force L, the
standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity draws σx, and the flow payoff from un-
employment b. In any steady state, total hires equal the outflows from unemployment.
Hence, the labor force, for a given level of hires, determines the outflow rate f , which we
target to equal its empirical counterpart of 0232 at a biweekly frequency. (This is calcu-
lated in the data based on the method of Shimer (2005) for the period 1951 to 2015.) To
replicate an average unemployment rate u of 6%, we set the inflow rate into unemploy-
ment at 00145 per fortnight by adjusting σx. Finally, conditional on an unemployment
rate, we set b to ensure an average establishment size in the range 17–21 employees,
consistent with Census Bureau data on average establishment and firm size.
To map the job finding rate f to labor market tightness θ, we assume a conventional
Cobb–Douglas matching function that implies the job-finding rate f = mθϕ where m
denotes matching efficiency. Using data for the period 1951 to 2015, and the methods of
Shimer (2005), we estimate a matching elasticity ϕ = 1/3. We then choose matching ef-
ficiency m= 029 so that the observed mean of tightness is consistent with a job-finding
rate of f = 0.232 (as in Pissarides (2009)). This yields θ= 053 and a vacancy rate, of 32%.
The values of these additional parameters underlying the resulting calibrations are sum-
marized in Table 1.
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Table 1. Parameters by inaction rate underlying numerical search model.
Values by Inaction Rate
Parameter Meaning 525% 67% 80% Reason
η Worker bargain power 0063 0026 0009 Real wage as procyclical as
employment
b Unemployment payoff 022 021 019 Average employer size
L Labor force 1915 1983 1957 Mean job-finding rate
σx Std. of x innovations 028 047 083 Mean unemployment
inflow rate
k Hiring cost 072 242 720 Inaction rate
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